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SUMMARY
LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN GREATER AMMAN \ E. GRAWERT 
Sierra Leone is known for the successful reintegration of a high number of returning refugees 
and internally displaced people (IDPs), many of whom had stayed in protracted displacement  
situations during the eleven years of a most cruel internal war. The war was intertwined with 
the civil war in Liberia and ended with a peace agreement in 2002. The extremely high number 
of returnees in relation to the total population caused particular hardship for the ‘least- 
developed’ country. Yet, Sierra Leone managed the task of reintegration of returnees from war, 
returning refugees from the West African region and IDPs without major disruptions and renewed 
outbreaks of violence. Neither a severe armed conflict nor new waves of forced displacement 
have re-occurred during the past 17 years. However, the acts of violence in the context of the 2018 
national election—and during the three previous post-war elections—justify the question 
whether the recurrent violence is related to shortcomings in the overall process of reintegration. 
This Working Paper, therefore, takes a retrospective look into the reintegration process at large. 
From the perspective of the communities that received returnees, not only returning refugees 
and IDPs but also former fighters who came back and reintegrated into civilian life. Furthermore, 
the perspective of people that did not reintegrate in Sierra Leone should not be overlooked in an 
assessment of the success of reintegration. Therefore, this Working Paper also incorporates the 
perspective of Sierra Leoneans that have stayed in Liberia and never returned. It hence addresses 
the following guiding questions: 
     \    How did the reintegration of displaced people, refugees and former fighters in Sierra Leone  
 take place, and how did the various groups returning after war manage to live together   
 in the long run?     
      \ What prevented people from reintegrating? 
The author and her team's research in 2018 benefitted from the fact that returnees, communities 
and the ‘non-returnees’ in Liberia were able to reflect on reintegration in hindsight. Reparation 
and reconciliation turned out to be crucial to make reintegration feasible. Therefore, the Working 
Paper argues that reconciliation among returning people and the communities where they settle 
is a crucial dimension that has to be closely linked to the concept of reintegration.  
The study shows that the reintegration process replicated the deep regional divide and the mar-
ginalisation of the youth that had caused the armed conflict and shaped the course of the war. 
The Paper concludes that refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants reintegrated into a disintegrated  
society—an environment producing grievances that fuel election-related violence. The insights 
from Sierra Leone should inform interventions of the international community in war-torn 
countries elsewhere and lead to a comprehensive reintegration process that incorporates refugees, IDPs 
as well as former fighters and is linked to reconciliation, reparations and development programmes. 
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Resignation is the state of mind of  
refugees that are unable to reintegrate—
They need African solutions such as 
resettlement within Africa.
Small groups of Sierra Leonean refugees that 
were threatened or rejected by their relatives and 
stigmatised in the neighbouring country for various 
reasons could neither integrate locally in Liberia nor 
return to Sierra Leone. For such groups of people in 
protracted displacement, the research findings sug-
gest that there is scope to advance agreements for  
resettlement in a third country within Africa—at 
least within the ECOWAS countries.
A comprehensive reintegration process 
should thwart tendencies of societal 
disintegration.  
The reintegration of returnees and ex-combatants 
in rural and urban Sierra Leone appears to be success-
ful as no renewed armed fighting has occurred. The 
analysis of people’s assessments in hindsight reveals, 
however, that there is a disturbing range of factors 
that perpetuated the long-standing regional and  
political divide and enhanced the disintegration of 
predominantly the youth. Reintegration after the war 
has failed to overcome societal disintegration. Recurrent 
election-related violence committed by strongmen 
mobilising the ‘lumpen youth for the dirty work’ and 
fuelling acts of revenge is symptomatic for this.
Reintegration processes should be 
comprehensive and equally include 
refugees, IDPs and former fighters. 
The intertwined wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
displaced about one-third of the total population. Dis-
placement made it easy for armed groups to forcibly 
recruit youth and children in particular. Crossing the 
border between Sierra Leone and Liberia back and 
forth was not only common for armed groups, but 
also for displaced people. Hence, the categories of IDPs, 
refugees and former fighters were blurred; after the 
war, communities had to reintegrate people that had 
belonged to all these groups. Special reintegration pro-
grammes according to categories do not match the  
reality receiving communities are facing.
Reintegration must be accompanied 
by reconciliation, reparations and com-
munity development in the long run.
In Sierra Leone, reconciliation took place through 
ceremonies of forgiving accompanied by reparations 
for war victims and community development projects 
as a short-term measure. In hindsight, two flaws can be 
identified: (1) war victims including displaced people 
that returned were disadvantaged compared to former 
fighters that received individual benefits; (2) acts of re-
venge pose a threat to people so that some refuse to  
return. To overcome resentments of civilians against 
former fighters and prevent revenge, the process of  
reconciliation must continue, cover urban and rural 
inhabitants as well as returnees, involve independent 
civil society organisations and be linked with develop-
ment that includes disadvantaged social groups.  
Main findings
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meagre wealth of both countries stems from exporting 
mineral resources (iron ore, diamonds and rutile) and 
raw agricultural products (timber, rubber, coffee, cocoa, 
fish) (CIA, 2019a; CIA, 2019b).3  Both countries still 
strongly rely on international assistance. Despite the 
hardship caused by the extremely high number of  
returning people and the reintegration into least- 
developed countries, Sierra Leone and Liberia man-
aged the task of reintegration of returnees—however 
with some disruptions and renewed outbreaks of vio-
lence during the first repatriation attempts (Sperl & 
De Vriese, 2005). Neither a severe armed conflict nor 
new waves of displacement have re-occurred during 
the past 17 years.4  
Communities not only reintegrated refugees and 
IDPs but also former fighters within a context of 
peacebuilding measures, transitional justice and a 
reconciliation process between war perpetrators and 
victims. Apparently, the reintegration of the diverse 
groups that were displaced due to war has been sus-
tainable—different from many other countries where 
lingering violent conflicts repeatedly have caused mass 
displacements and hence, overturned reintegration 
attempts.5  It is worthwhile, therefore, to take a retro-
spective look at how the government of Sierra Leone 
and international agencies supported the process  
of reintegration of refugees, IDPs and returning 
ex-combatants. The views of community  
inhabitants who received the various returning 
groups and managed to live with them will be par-
ticularly instructive. This Working Paper, therefore,  
presents empirical findings that reveal how commu-
nities perceive the process of reintegration of refugees 
 
3 \  Both countries have remained among the poorest in the world  
measured by the Human Ddevelopment Index of the United Nations 
Development Programme. In 2018, Liberia was ranked 181 and Sierra 
Leone 184 out of 189 countries (UNCTAD, 2018).
4 \  Whereas the numbers of emigrants and immigrants were balanced 
until 2009, in 2010 the net emigration comprised 4.66 per 1,000 of the 
population and gradually decreased to 2.1 per 1,000 during the follow-
ing years until 2017 (Index Mundi, 2018).
5 \  South Sudan, Afghanistan and Colombia are some of many examples 
for recurrent waves of return followed by renewed displacement.
Sierra Leone is known for its successful reintegra-
tion of a high number of returning refugees and inter-
nally displaced people (IDPs) following eleven years of 
a most cruel internal war. According to an evaluation 
commissioned by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the repatriation of 
272,000 Sierra Leonean refugees between 2002 and 
2004, “(r)eturnees visited in all major areas of return 
unanimously expressed their satisfaction at being 
back home and their appreciation of the aid operation 
which had helped them along the way” (Sperl & De 
Vriese, 2005, p. 1). 
The war was intertwined with the civil war in  
Liberia and ended with a peace agreement in 2002. 
More than 320,000 persons died in these wars that dis-
placed about one-third of the population within each 
country and created about two million refugees scat-
tered mostly in West Africa. Many Sierra Leoneans 
and Liberians faced protracted displacement as they 
repeatedly fled across the border between the two 
countries and to Guinea (Conacry), Ghana and Mali, 
among others.1  Both countries successfully terminat-
ed the wars in the early 2000s without reverting to  
extensive violence after that. 
By 2005, nearly half a million of Sierra Leoneans 
returned; a further 60,000 came back to Sierra Leone 
by 2010 (World Data Atlas, 2015).2  Due to the mass  
return and a high birth rate of five births per woman, 
the population of Sierra Leone grew by nearly 40 per 
cent between 2000 and 2010 (UNICEF, 2015). Agricul-
ture has been the main source of livelihood—mainly 
for subsistence—of more than 61 per cent of the nearly 
eight million inhabitants of Sierra Leone and 70 per  
cent of the five million Liberians to this date. The  
 
1 \  According to estimates of UNHCR, about 400,000 Sierra Leoneans left 
during the war and became refugees mainly in the neighbouring 
countries. At the same time, more than half a million Liberians left 
their country due to war. About 67,000 Liberians fled to Sierra Leone 
and 200,000 Sierra Leoneans to Liberia (UNHCR, 2004a, b; Palmisano & 
Momodu, 2013). Estimations vary greatly, because in fact, many people 
moved between countries several times and returned temporarily so 
that they were not accurately counted.
2 \  15,000 Sierra Leoneans opted to stay abroad and integrate locally in 
the neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2004b). Nearly 2,650 were reset-
tled in northern America and western Europe until 2005 (UNHCR, 
2005). Nearly 3,000 Liberians were resettled in the United States in 
2003 (Patrick, 2004).
Introduction
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To answer the research questions, the Working  
Paper applies a concept of reintegration in the broad 
sense required to include refugees, IDPs and former 
fighters. Moreover, it links reintegration to reparations, 
community development and reconciliation. This is 
justified as all these groups returned into a society 
that had suffered from divisions into armed groups, 
perpetrators of atrocities, war victims, displaced people, 
refugees, beneficiaries from the war economy and 
many more sub-groups. The Working Paper provides 
people’s perspectives on successes, shortcomings and 
failures of reparation and reconciliation in hindsight. 
An important source for this chapter is the discussion 
during a Stakeholder Workshop with Sierra Leonean 
scholars on “How can protracted displacement come to an 
end?  (Re-)integration and reconciliation of war-affected  
Sierra Leoneans and Liberians in a long-term perspective”.8  
8 \  The author and Dr Sylvanus Spencer conducted this stakeholder work-
shop at the Department of History and African Studies, Fourah Bay 
College University, Freetown with participants from the Sierra Leonean 
academia and civil society on 6 July 2018.
IDPs as well as former fighters in hindsight.6  It  
addresses the following guiding question:
   \ How did the reintegration of displaced people, 
refugees and former fighters in Sierra Leone 
take place, and how did the various groups  
returning after war manage to live together in 
the long run?   
To make the assessment complete, the Working 
Paper also asks:
   \ What prevented people from reintegrating?
For this purpose, the perspectives of Sierra Leoneans 
who never returned but still stayed in Liberia in 2018 
are included here. 
Just before the research began, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone had been in the headlines of the international 
media who were spreading the good news that in 
both countries, a peaceful change of government had 
taken place through free and fair democratic elections. 
Both countries seem to have proven that they left the 
devastating civil wars of the 1990s far behind and 
moved towards consolidated democracies.7  However, 
the 2018 election in Sierra Leone was accompanied by 
an extent of unrest, harassment, damage and violence 
that greatly differed from the ordinary interaction of 
Sierra Leoneans. This was not the first time, but vio-
lence had been associated with the three previous 
elections, too, and had always subsided after that. This 
phenomenon suggests taking the violence during 
elections as an indicator for possible flaws in the post-
war reintegration process.
6 \  The Paper draws from qualitative social research conducted between 
April and July 2018 in Sierra Leone and Liberia, funded by the German 
Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as 
part of the research project “Protected rather than protracted. 
Strengthening refugees and peace”.
7 \  Liberia held its third democratic election in December 2017 and George 
Weah (Congress for Democratic Change Party) superseded Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf, who had been the first elected president after the end of the 
civil war and at rule since 2005. In Sierra Leone, the candidate of the 
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), Julius Maada Bio, won over the  
candidate of the All People’s Party (APC) who had been at rule for two 
terms since 2007. After the SLPP had led the first democratically elected 
post-war government from 2002 to 2007, the APC ruled for eleven years 
until the SLPP took over power again in March 2018.
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UNHCR equates reintegration with ‘sustainable 
return’ defining it as “the ability of returning refugees 
to secure the political, economic, legal and social con-
ditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity” 
(UNHCR, 2004a, p. 38). Scholars have stressed the role of 
the state in providing returnees with equally effective 
protection like other citizens and the state’s responsi-
bility in guaranteeing them the same degree of security 
and basic rights. Moreover, if the state fails creating 
these equal conditions, there should be the possibility 
to hold the state accountable (Bradley, 2008). This 
Working Paper acknowledges this point. Hence, here 
the term ‘reintegration’ is used in a broad sense, com-
prising the access to livelihood options and social 
relations that enable returnees and receiving commu-
nities to lead a life in dignity. It also includes the 
fulfillment of legal and political obligations and rights 
by the state towards people who return after war 
equally as it does towards those who have stayed in 
the country. ‘Reintegration’ thus requires not only the 
efforts of the returnees and the members of the com-
munities to which they return but also efforts by state 
authorities and the government as well as humanitarian 
and development agencies to create the enabling  
conditions that make reintegration possible. 
Besides people who were displaced due to armed 
violence, former soldiers, recruits of various armed 
groups and child soldiers also reintegrate in commu-
nities, usually after a disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration (DDR) programme. Studies reveal 
that both formerly displaced people, as well as 
ex-combatants, do not necessarily return to their orig-
inal home areas but often reintegrate elsewhere, often 
in urban areas (Black, 2002; Hammond, 2004; Howard 
& Madzarevic, 2014; Kingma et al., 2018). From the  
perspective of communities, reintegration hence  
refers to diverse groups of people, among them refu-
gees, IDPs, former combatants returning to their area 
of origin as well as others that reintegrate in these 
communities as newcomers stemming from the 
same country. The Paper takes the perspective of the 
Conceptual approach
communities as a starting point and hence uses rein-
tegration as a term that comprises all of those groups 
that arrive in communities after war with the inten-
tion to stay.
A process of reconciliation is the foundation for 
the ability of war-affected groups to live together again 
and reintegrate peacefully. Hence, reconciliation does 
not only actively involve war perpetrators and victims 
in personal encounters, like in truth and reconciliation 
commissions. It also requires the government to shape 
reconstruction after war in a way that facilitates the 
reconciliation of people while reintegrating within 
various local communities. ‘Reconciliation’ is thus 
understood here as a deliberate and conscious process 
that involves not only the upper level of political and 
war leaders but also the mid-range perpetrators and 
their victims as well as displaced people. What is  
important is that a process of reconciliation can  
influence the decision of refugees and IDPs to return. 
The term applied here hence includes measures such 
as “timely interventions in support of human rights 
protection, livelihoods, educational opportunities and 
reconstruction [that] may play critical roles in sup-
porting community-level reconciliation and, in turn, 
the sustainable (re) integration of refugees and IDPs” 
(Bradley, 2012, p. 5). 
The following assumptions that stem from the rele-
vant academic literature are guiding the subsequent 
analysis:
1\ The process of reintegration comprises return,  
reconstruction, restitution of land and / or  
property, basic rights and equal protection by the 
state for returnees as well as those who have  
stayed in the country during the war (Macrae, 1999; 
Juergensen, 2000; IDMC, 2007; Bradley, 2008).
2\ Local integration requires a range of precondi-
tions that reach far beyond livelihood opportuni-
ties. A permanent legal status may suffice for 
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some groups in addition; other groups may have 
further social, psychological, cultural or political 
requirements related to the war experience.  
Continuous cross-border movement in the  
region fosters integration that may have a trans-
local character (Gale, 2006; Hovil & Lomo, 2015;  
Carciotto, 2016).
3\ Reconciliation procedures bring victims and per-
petrators together and demand confession and 
forgiveness. The involvement of ex-combatants 
plays a crucial part in reconciliation, because 
they killed, raped, tortured and abused civilians 
during war. Reconciliation is the first step towards 
justice but needs to be accompanied by putting 
perpetrators on trial (Albrecht, 2010; Bøås & 
Bjørkhaug, 2010; Bradley, 2012). Beyond these  
aspects, reconciliation should be regarded as part 
of the reintegration process as it may be crucial 
to make reintegration sustainable. Reconciliation, 
it is assumed, has the potential of enabling people 
living in the community to go beyond a mere 
co-existence with those who return from abroad, 
other parts of the country and from fighting.
4\ Reintegration in this broad sense enables a society, 
in the long run, to address conflicts through  
mediating institutions. This, in turn, enhances 
the rule of law.
The last assumption is derived from the previous 
three assumptions and requires taking a long-term or 
hindsight perspective on (re-)integration. It links the 
post-war (re-)integration process to the contemporary 
status of justice institutions. The role the relevant in-
stitutions play when it comes to rising violence in the 
context of elections will be examined as an indicator 
for the degree of rule of law that has been achieved 
compared to the lawlessness during the war.
This Working Paper is based on four months of 
field research in 2018. Two districts in eastern Sierra 
Leone (Kenema and Kailahun) and Freetown were the 
research sites, as from there, many Sierra Leoneans 
had been displaced during the war and returned  
during the 2000s. Time constraints did not allow the 
research team to cover more sites in the country with 
field research; hence, this Working Paper incorporates 
the perspective from the North through the available 
literature and interviews with individuals from Temne 
and followers of the All People’s Congress (APC) living 
in the eastern region. 
In Liberia, we conducted interviews with commu-
nity members around refugee and IDP camps and the 
camp inhabitants themselves. These included Samukai 
Town, Jah Tondo Town, VOA (Voice of America) and 
Cemenco (Bushrod Island). We got the first access 
through a Sierra Leonean returnee from Liberia in 
Kenema, who provided us with the contact of the 
former chairman of one of the camps.  Julius J. Togba 
carried out most of the interviews in Liberia.
We applied thematic coding to analyse the docu-
mented interviews.9  This method generated the key 
concepts guiding this Working Paper—(re-)integration, 
reconciliation, resignation and revenge. A deeper anal-
ysis of all available sources revealed potential links 
between the concepts which informed the structure 
of this study. The aspect of ‘resignation’ came from 
Sierra Leonean refugees staying on in Liberia without 
being integrated. ‘Revenge’ turned up as a recurrent 
theme in many interviews in Sierra Leone. The research 
team identified revenge as the connecting variable 
between (re-)integration, reconciliation and the  
violence in the context of elections.  
Against this backdrop, it appears justified to use 
acts of violence in the context of elections as an indi-
cator for incomplete (re-)integration. Beyond a better 
understanding of the links between the dimensions 
of (re-)integration, non-integration and reconciliation, 
the aim of the analysis is to learn from successes and 
failures in (re-)integration in order to improve (re-)in-
tegration processes and include clear steps towards 
the rule of law in other war-affected societies. 
9 \  In qualitative social research, this method requires a thorough 
analysis of the interview transcripts and an open collection of the 
themes that can be identified from the data. In a second step, these 
themes are structured into main themes to which sub-themes are 
allocated, thus building a template (King, 1998; Richards, 2005). This 
process moves on between collecting further data, re-thinking the 
template
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Box 1
Research sites in Sierra Leone and Liberia
Conakry
Kambia
Koidu
Bo
Pujehun
Monrovia
Robertsport
Bensonville
Robertsport
Freetown Voinjama
Kailahun
Bomaru
Baiwala
Kenema
LIBERIA
SIERRA
LEONE
GUINEA
Bensonville
Monrovia
Sinje
Sass Town
Jah Tondo Samukai TownVoA¹, Cemenco
Robertsport
Sources: Natural Earth Data 2018  Map Layout: Hannes Blitza, Feb. 2019
provincial/district capital
visited district
Research Locations
capital
visited town/ village or site
visited refugee camp
¹ Voice of America
West Africa Research Locations
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The reintegration of returning refugees and IDPs 
after the war was a reintegration into a historically  
divided society. The roots of the division lie in the  
colonial history. Towards independence (in 1961) two 
main political parties had established regional 
strongholds that coincided with ethnic majorities: 
the Temne in the north following the All People’s  
Congress (APC) and the Mende in the south-east and 
south following the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), 
with the SLPP forming the first elected  government 
(1962-1967). Both the APC and the SLPP had youth 
wings that played a marginal political role and were 
constantly excluded from the real party power. The 
parties used the youth as ‘foot soldiers’, and politically 
ambitious members of the youth wings occasionally 
mobilised the ‘lumpen youth’ “as thugs to do the 
dirty work” (Abdullah, 1998, p. 207). After the APC had 
won the ballot in 1967, the SLPP used its connections 
with the military to stage a coup d´état immediately 
after, followed by a counter-coup that brought the 
APC back to power in 1968. The APC leadership turned 
the political system into a one-party dictatorship. 
The division of the society and the marginalisation of 
the youth became inherent in the political system 
during the following 23 years of APC rule. 
Economic decay and the exclusion of large social 
groups from any redistribution by the regime were 
the main causes of the violent conflict that started in 
1991. Scholars therefore presented the main cause of 
the war as a “crisis of the state and the deepening of 
the gains of patrimonialism” (Bangura, 1997, p. 134), 
“elite parasitism and repression” (Kandeh, 1999, p. 349) 
and “long-term exclusionary processes” (Fanthorpe, 
2001, p. 363). The war started in the most marginalised 
area in Kailahun district in eastern Sierra Leone 
where the main armed group, the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), allied with the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles Taylor from Liberia 
in its fight against the Sierra Leonean government. 
Only in 1999 did the Lomé Peace Accord between the 
government of Sierra Leone and the RUF set the stage 
to end the decade-long cruel “fratricidal war” (UNSC, 
1999) gradually and with some setbacks. 
The political divide in Sierra Leone resurfaced 
during the first post-war elections in 2002, when the 
SLPP won in a landslide victory. International observ-
ers considered the presidential and parliamentary 
election as democratic (TRC, 2004). Most of the voters 
in eastern and south-eastern Sierra Leone elected the 
SLPP whereas the APC regained its constituencies in 
northern Sierra Leone. The RUF party won not a single 
seat in parliament and has never re-occurred in poli-
tics ever since (for a historical overview see Annex). 
Sierra Leoneans had fled from the start of the war 
in 1991; most of them to safer villages, small towns 
and regional towns in Sierra Leone or across the border 
to Guinea (Conakry) and Liberia but also to Mali.  
Sierra Leoneans fleeing to Guinea mostly came from 
Kailahun, Kono, Kenema and Kambia districts and 
concentrated in the Gueckedou and Forecariah areas. 
Their number was estimated at 370,000. Liberia  
received about 120,000 Sierra Leonean refugees  
(UNHCR, 2004) whose background was mostly rural; 
many originated from the timber and diamond-rich 
eastern region of Sierra Leone—Bo, Kailahun, Kenema 
and Pujehun districts. About 75 per cent of the refugees 
were women and children. Initially, they were accom-
modated in camps in the western region of Liberia—
Cape Mount, Montserrado and Vahun districts (UNHCR, 
1998). In addition, the government of Liberia provided 
the UNHCR with unused land (which was owned by 
absent Liberians) for refugee camps in the vicinity of 
Monrovia (interview with assistant UNHCR protection 
officer in Monrovia, May 2018). How the governments 
of Sierra Leone and Liberia and international agencies 
assisted the process of (re-)integration of several 
hundred thousand refugees and IDPs and how 
communities perceive this process in hindsight is  
the focus of this chapter.  
Displacement, processes and the (re-)integration of 
returning population groups
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Refugees who returned from Liberia and Guinea 
to the eastern region without any repatriation  
programme received some assistance from UNHCR, 
which also rehabilitated some war-affected buildings 
(UNHCR, 1998). In hindsight, the reintegration of  
vulnerable persons such as mutilated war victims,  
orphans and raped women proved to be very difficult 
in the eastern region of Sierra Leone. Many vulnerable 
persons were abandoned after some time, latest when 
assisting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
lost funding. The question of who would care for the 
children who were affected by the war remained 
open and has not been solved to this date. Donor- 
funded orphanages collapsed when funding came to 
a halt as they did not have any strategy to sustain 
themselves. Many children had no one who cared for 
them and lived in the streets selling small amounts 
of commodities in the market (interviews with a pastor 
in Kenema, April 2018 and a staff member of an NGO 
engaged in child protection, Kailahun, May 2018).
Ex-combatants were mixed with civilian refugees, 
a situation that posed a serious concern for UNHCR. 
In Guinea, UNHCR did not obtain access to arrested 
or detained refugees and asylum-seekers that were 
allegedly soldiers and fighters of the AFRC and RUF. 
In a first attempt to separate fighters from civilian 
refugees, UNHCR involved ECOMOG (UNHCR, 1998) 
despite its bad record with regard to human rights 
(HRW, 1993). The mixture of civilians and fighters 
was even exceeded in the refugee camps for Liberians 
in Sierra Leone and for Sierra Leoneans in Liberia,  
as these also became de facto shelters for IDPs of 
each country. Some local inhabitants pretended to be 
refugees to get access to assistance. Hence, these 
camps were areas of integration, furthering social  
interaction between Liberians and Sierra Leoneans, 
between IDPs, refugees and former fighters.
Repatriation attempts before the end 
of the war
UNHCR started a first repatriation programme 
covering 2,000 individuals when the violence subsided 
in Sierra Leone after an election in 1996 that brought 
the SLPP to power. First groups of refugees from the 
neighbouring countries returned on their own at this 
time, too (UNHCR, 1998). A coup d’état of the united 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and  
the RUF (the ‘junta’) brought these endeavours to a 
halt in 1997. Subsequent fighting between the junta 
and the Kamajors10  who supported the forces of the 
Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the  
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
caused a huge new refugee movement and displaced 
large numbers of Sierra Leoneans again. UNHCR set 
up camps for IDPs and returning refugees, but bad road 
conditions hampered the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance (UNHCR, 1998; Sperl & De Vriese, 2005). At 
the request of the government, UNHCR assisted those 
Sierra Leoneans who returned to Freetown and 
housed more than 10,000 persons in a camp in  
Waterloo, a suburb of Freetown. Soon after, the junta 
conquered Waterloo, and those among the just repat-
riated Sierra Leoneans who could escape fled again to 
Liberia and Guinea (interview with a former camp 
chairman in Monrovia, May 2018). 
Within Liberia, UNHCR transferred 16,000 Sierra 
Leonean refugees from Vahun to Kolahun district in 
order to increase the distance from the violence-af-
fected border areas in 1998. Together with a range of 
partner organisations, UNHCR provided vocational 
training and income-generating projects in the refu-
gee camps, focusing on women. Children benefited 
from recreational activities. Special assistance was 
offered for victims of sexual violence, and UNHCR co-
ordinated family tracing and reunification activities 
with UNICEF (UNHCR, 1998).
10 \  These were groups of armed men mostly from the Mende-speaking 
eastern region of Sierra Leone. They had emerged as fighters from 
Mende societies that used to hunt for the local chiefs and were  
ascribed mystical power. Many educated members of the Kamajors 
engaged in the war against the RUF after undergoing an initiation 
ritual to become ‘bullet-proof’ (Shaw, 2003).
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In 2001, when the disarmament of ex-combatants 
had been finalised in Sierra Leone, UNHCR started a 
large repatriation programme from the camps in 
Liberia and Guinea to Sierra Leone, providing volun-
tarily returning refugees with transportation and 
initial reintegration benefits. Renewed armed clashes 
between forces loyal to Taylor and factions of the  
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD)11  affected the refugee camps for Sierra Leoneans 
around Monrovia and endangered 30,000 persons 
(USCRI, 2002). The fighting was driven by fierce com-
petition over the control of the gold- and diamond- 
rich northern areas of Liberia (Cue, 2002). Taylor’s 
forces were feared for indiscriminately killing civil-
ians, rape and torture and for burning and looting  
villages and refugee camps, but also the LURD com-
batants committed atrocities, prevented people from 
fleeing and forced civilians to work for them (USCRI, 
2002). From the perspective of Sierra Leonean refu-
gees in the Liberian camps, they fell ‘out of the frying 
pan into the fire’ as the armed groups recruited 
young men and children as fighters and committed 
atrocities against parents, women and men trying to 
hide the youth from them (interview with Sierra 
Leonean refugees in Monrovia, May 2018). 
As the Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia were 
caught up in the endangered camps, UNHCR came 
under pressure to accelerate its repatriation pro-
gramme. An international NGO stated, "(d)isplace-
ment sites have become virtually the front lines in a 
Liberian war otherwise lacking front lines" (USCRI, 
2002). UNHCR utilised trucks in order to quickly  
repatriate Sierra Leoneans from the camps near  
Monrovia in February 2002. Upon arrival in Blama,  
a way station on the road to Kenema, the capital of 
the eastern region, the returning refugees received a 
two-month supply of food, kitchen sets, blankets and 
other materials. From Kenema, the returnees continued 
the journey on their own or used transportation  
provided by aid agencies (Cue, 2002). 
11 \  The LURD formed in 1999 to fight against the government of Charles 
Taylor.
The ravage of the armed groups also displaced 
more than 60,000 Liberians. Many fled across the  
borders, increasing the number of Liberian refugees 
in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast to about 
250,000, whereas 200,000 Liberians were internally 
displaced. Around 100,000 Liberian IDPs were living 
in camps and at risk of becoming victims of attacks. 
The arrival of new Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone 
put an enormous strain on the villages in the eastern 
region. The effort to reintegrate tens of thousands of 
repatriated Sierra Leoneans was at risk. The process 
was already difficult due to a shortage of housing and 
continued strife in several chiefdoms. Moreover, Sierra 
Leonean schools were lacking teachers and hence, 
could not enrol refugee children from Liberia (USRCI, 
2002; Sperl & De Vriese, 2005).
To sum up, the early repatriation attempts of  
UNHCR put the returning groups at a high risk as 
they were repeatedly caught up in armed fighting. 
The effects were renewed displacements and waves 
of refugees. This experience suggests that a thorough 
context analysis and well-planned timing of repatria-
tion are crucial to create the pre-onditions for lasting 
reintegration of returning refugees that provides 
them with perspectives to stay in safety (cf. also Sperl 
& De Vriese, 2005).
Return and (re-)integration after the 
end of the wars 
In 2002, a government was in place that finally 
implemented the peace agreement. The task ahead of 
the government, society, and the international aid 
agencies was tremendous. UNHCR organised another 
large-scale repatriation programme for 272,000 regis-
tered refugees that returned from protracted dis-
placement to Sierra Leone between 2002 and 2004 and 
170,000 refugees returning to Liberia. The real number, 
including the unregistered refugees, was much higher, 
as the borders in West Africa are open, and people 
move in and out of countries without being counted. 
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UNHCR was prepared to provide assistance through 
the establishment of small-scale community-based 
projects in those countries where a larger number of 
refugees planned to integrate, such as Liberia. UNHCR 
kept field offices for the repatriation of around 55,000 
Liberian refugees still in Sierra Leone (UNHCR, 2004). 
How refugees and IDPs reflect on their experi-
ences in hindsight is the subject of the following 
sections.
Displacement experiences
Most Sierra Leoneans were displaced at least for 
some time during the war. In the largely agricultural 
areas of eastern Sierra Leone, some tried to stay near 
their fields and would even hide in a cave with the 
whole family (local chief, Kenema, May 2018). Accord-
ing to the mayor of Kenema City Council, “when the 
war started in eastern Sierra Leone, so many people 
left and stayed in the neighbouring countries. Many 
lost all their family here” (interview in April 2018). 
The trauma some villagers experienced by the 
displacement and what it means that ‘many lost all 
their family’ is revealed in the story of a woman in 
her forties who was living in Baiwala (May 2018) (see 
Box 1). 
In addition, more than 340,000 internally displaced 
Sierra Leoneans and nearly 360,000 persons displaced 
within Liberia reintegrated in their countries (UNHCR, 
2004a, b; Sperl & De Vriese, 2005; Palmisano & Momodu, 
2013). These are the ‘known’ numbers that UNHCR 
documented. Estimates of the real numbers of dis-
placed people go up to 2.6 million displaced people 
within Sierra Leone (Kaldor, 2006) and one million in 
Liberia (Vinck et al., 2011).
UNHCR supplied the returnees with assistance 
packages. Each returning family received a bag of rice, 
a jerry can, some food, a gallon of cooking oil, SLL 
25,000 (USD 12) and agricultural tools “to help them 
establish their new lives in communities of origin” 
(UNHCR, 2004). This indicates the expectation of 
UNHCR that the refugees would return to their com-
munities of origin. The field research findings show 
that this pertains to some whereas a considerable 
number of refugees decided otherwise (see below).
UNHCR also carried out community-based short-
term reintegration projects in cooperation with the 
government of Sierra Leone, donors and NGOs until 
2005. The programmes included skills trainings,  
construction of local health clinics and wells and 
upgrading of schools (UNHCR, 2004). Many local  
inhabitants pretended to be refugees and registered 
in the camps to get access to aid (interview with a 
pastor, Kenema, April 2018). The repatriation pro-
gramme to Sierra Leone ended in July 2004 (UNHCR, 
2004), and in the same year, UNHCR ceased to consider 
the former refugee camps in Liberia as ‘camps’.  
UNHCR and the Liberia Repatriation and Resettle-
ment Commission (LRRRC), a Liberian government 
institution, informed the refugees about the decision 
taken by the Liberian government stating that assis-
tance for persons staying in the former camps termi-
nated in 2004. Only in exceptional cases would UNHCR 
still distribute tarpaulin and used clothes to individ-
uals (interview with assistant protection officer of 
UNHCR in Monrovia, May 2018). 
According to UNHCR, an estimated 92,000 Sierra 
Leonean refugees returned on their own without  
UNHCR assistance, and around 15,000 persons opted 
to stay in their host countries and integrate locally. 
Box 1 
Account of an internally displaced woman
Before the war broke out, I had a dream. I was running into the bush 
with bundles on my head. People told me not to come back. Three days 
later, the dream became real. I was in a village nearby with my one 
month-old baby to visit my sister. There we heard that war had started 
in Bomaru. With many others, I ran to the bush without knowing 
where to go. Soldiers came towards us and said, follow us to Daru [a 
small town in Kailahun district] if you want to survive. … The RUF 
came and attacked several times. People went to many different places 
in the district. Some ran to the river Moa and drowned when they tried 
to cross it. Then I heard that my husband had died. Soldiers returned 
us to Daru. Things became normal. We went to a small village where 
we could stay at my elder brother’s compound. We got rice there. Then 
my brother left for another village. I followed him with my baby as I 
could not get any income. I went to my sister in the same chiefdom. 
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property rights and domestic violence, but also had 
horrible experiences such as births as a result of rape 
and sexual slavery, followed by being shunned and 
punished for giving birth to 'rebel' children (TRC, 
2004).
Besides widespread internal displacement, many 
Sierra Leoneans crossed the border to Liberia when 
the war broke out, during the war and often did this 
several times. One account is presented here to show 
under which conditions families had to struggle for 
survival in the centre of the cross-border war and 
were rescued by Liberian villagers (see Box 3).
This account confirms what has been stated in 
the literature about the commonalities between Sierra 
Leoneans and Liberians that has the potential for 
peaceful co-existence. The closeness of culture and 
language is important for this. Kandeh (1992) empha-
sised that the different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone 
are related historically and linguistically and have 
connections that transcend the colonial boundaries 
to the ethnic groups in neighbouring Liberia and 
Guinea. He held that the trans-ethnic connections of 
the Sierra Leonean ethnic groups can create an open-
ing for a peaceful co-existence (Kandeh, 1992). 
This account is typical for the internal displace-
ment of the rural population of Sierra Leone during 
the war. It clarifies the dependence on the relatives 
living in the neighbouring chiefdoms that temporarily 
received displaced people who were constantly on 
the move, with babies and small children, as mothers 
whose husbands were away fighting and who repeat-
edly lost track of their closest relatives. Other IDPs 
were caught by armed groups during displacement, 
as in the following report of a female inhabitant of 
Baiwala (May 2018) (see Box 2).
Beyond the loss of children and the terrible expe-
rience of a forced marriage to a member of an armed 
group, this account also sheds some light on the 
internal boundaries, in particular the ethnic and  
regional divide that persisted during the war. It also 
reveals the difficulty—at least among rural people—
to be included across the dividing line which leads to 
the effort to finally return to the ethnic home. The 
examples confirm that women were perpetrators or 
collaborated with armed groups out of conviction, but 
also out of the need to survive. Women were not only 
discriminated against under common or customary 
laws in the realms of marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
Box 2  
Account of a displaced woman who was caught by the RUF
When the war broke out, I was nine months pregnant. I gave birth and 
ran to the forest until I reached Tongo [a diamond mining town in 
Kenema province]. It took four days to get there. Still during the war, I 
had another pregnancy. Upon fire from rebels, my firstborn was shot in 
his arm. I ran away with the baby girl and left the boy. We went to a 
village. Then the war ended and we returned to Baiwala. Six months 
later, a jet threw bombs that destroyed our house. My daughter died. I 
ran with many others up to Kono district. My brother, who lived in 
Freetown, managed to come and take me there. I stayed in Waterloo. 
When the RUF came [conquering Waterloo in 1999], one of them 
caught me and took me to a village near Bo. I was forcefully married to 
him. After he had passed the DDR programme, he told me that each of 
us should go our own way. As a Mende, I left the Temne region. I 
walked up to the Moyamba junction [near the ‘border’ of the northern 
province] and stayed there with a friend. I worked in horticulture and 
sold crops and saved some money. Then I paid for transport and came 
back here to Baiwala where I hail from.
The RUF reached there. We went to a small place near the river Moa 
and stayed in the bush. My baby fell sick. I prayed and the baby recov-
ered. We went to Kenema where we stayed with my cousin. I took my 
daughter to the hospital. We were taken care of by an international 
team.
At the time of the 1996 election, we saw people with different dresses—
made of red cloth—and with guns. We voted. After the election, we left 
the hospital. The elected president Tijan Kabbah announced the end of 
the war and told the people to return home. I refused as I had nothing 
in my village and stayed in Kenema. My sister’s husband came to  
Kenema, and he was a Kamajor now. He told us that in the villages 
there was war again. He did not know where my sister was with their 
children. Her husband went to Freetown. My sister died (the woman 
starts crying) when she was giving birth. All my sister’s children died 
except for one boy. I went to Pendehun, where my grandmother lived, 
but could neither find her nor the boy. My grandmother was in another 
village. The RUF had taken her. Then my grandmother was released, 
and I met her in Pendembu. When the coup d’état happened [in 1997], 
we moved to Malema chiefdom. There my grandmother died. I went 
back to Kenema to my cousin. The son of her brother took me to my 
home village. I married again and came to Baiwala. I had four 
children.”
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Reintegration experiences
In eastern Sierra Leone, the war left numerous 
villages devastated. Most of the local interview  
partners had to rebuild their burnt houses using local 
materials such as mud and bamboo to thatch new 
roofs. The help of relatives was crucial for young 
women returning with children but without a hus-
band. Many of them had been forced to marry a  
member of a non-state armed group or had become 
pregnant after having been raped. Unlike the parents 
of young women who returned alone, relatives 
seemed to be better able to distance themselves  
sufficiently from the prevailing social values so that 
they were able to integrate the women more easily 
(interviews with inhabitants of Baiwala, May 2018). 
Although the interview partners had been dis-
placed during the 1990s—more than 20 years before 
the interviews—, they vividly remembered the details. 
In the village, several inhabitants also talked to the 
author and her assistant, presumably as we were out-
siders and ready to listen. However, the above  
accounts suffice to imagine the constant threat and 
fear and terrifying events that accompanied the IDPs 
throughout the war.
Sierra Leoneans who had fled abroad and were 
received at a refugee camp had different experiences. 
One case may suffice here to indicate how opportuni-
ties can arise from displacement, in particular for  
people with an urban middle class background (see 
Box 4).
This refugee had the opportunity of receiving 
education in the refugee camp. He had his first teach-
ing experiences in the camp school and used his 
skills still in 2018 when we met him in Kenema. How-
ever, even this account reveals how the constant 
threat of being caught in an attack during the ev-
er-reigniting armed conflicts influences the deci-
sions of movement in and out of camps and in and 
out of the countries at war. 
The next section highlights how displaced people 
managed the return after the end of the war accord-
ing to their own perceptions in hindsight.
Box 3  
Account of a man who had fled to Liberia
When the war broke out, my family andI ran to Liberia through the 
forest. In the bush, rebels caught me and slashed my arm. My wife 
sought for food so that we could survive. We had no medicine except 
herbs. We spent several years in a village in Liberia where we stayed 
with the town chief who was from the Bondi tribe that speaks a similar 
language as ours. My wife asked him for assistance, and he gave us 
some land. Our children helped to clear the land. We lived there humbly 
as one family with the Liberians and learned to be of easy mind, even 
when someone offended us.” .
Box 4  
Account of a teacher who stayed in a refugee camp 
An inhabitant of Kenema who had become a teacher reported that his 
parents were displaced from home first. Then a friend told him to leave, 
too. At that time, around 1994, he was 25 years old. He went by road to 
Dar Salam at the border to Liberia and reached Monrovia. After three 
months, he was registered as a refugee there. However, there were not 
sufficient supplies at the camp, and in 1996, the camp was attacked, 
and one person was killed. Many people ran away. According to the 
teacher, “it was not serious—just the thieves amongst the fighters” 
carried out the attack, and soon the refugees returned. 
The young man received a sponsorship from UNHCR for a six month 
training as a teacher and then started teaching in the primary school 
of the camp. In 1999, he was elected chairman of the camp. He said 
that, according to his own experience, “Liberians are friendly, whereas 
for Sierra Leoneans it takes time until they open up to other people. … 
Those Sierra Leoneans who stay in Liberia prefer an easy way of look-
ing after their lives. They are not well educated and seek opportunities 
to work in diamond mines or getting aid.”
When another war faction took over power in Monrovia [probably the 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) ], he left 
after six years in the camp. In 2002, he travelled by boat to Freetown 
with his Liberian wife and children (interview with a teacher, Kenema, 
April 2018).
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Several refugees had learnt a trade in a refugee camp 
and made use of their new skills after their return to 
Sierra Leone, often in a different village or town than 
the place of origin. Development projects in Sierra  
Leone brought new people together in income-gener-
ating activities. Whereas many of these activities  
collapsed when the project ended, some beneficiaries 
built stable groups with their own savings and redis-
tribution mechanisms, thus providing some kind of a 
social safety net to the members (interviews with 
local income-generating groups, Kailahun, May 2018).
Hence, the current society of Sierra Leone is 
made up of people with different backgrounds ac-
cording to their displacement trajectories. Many have 
stayed in various West African countries or inside  
Sierra Leone and developed different political views. 
Those differences may have contributed to the recur-
rent electoral conflicts.
Many returned refugees and IDPs reintegrated in 
their home villages. Bomaru, the village where the 
war began (made visible by a war memorial in the 
centre) used to be a coffee- and cocoa-producing  
community. Most of the inhabitants were displaced 
due to the war. When they returned, the local chief 
organised them in groups of ten to twenty people for 
brushing and cultivating. They brought their harvest 
to the market and built their houses. The income  
enabled them to buy corrugated iron sheets for roofs 
as well as other materials (result from discussion 
with village assembly, Bomaru, May 2018). However, 
land disputes occurred in areas where investors or 
powerful individuals had acquired land so that  
returning IDPs and refugees were denied their right, 
or in cases where local inhabitants claimed land 
from less powerful people. A constitutional review 
committee was set up to resolve these disputes  
without any final result in 2018 (journalist in Kenema, 
April 2018).
Sierra Leoneans who returned from Liberia pre-
ferred to settle in the eastern Sierra Leonean towns 
close to the border with a good road connection. This 
enabled them to move between Sierra Leone and  
Liberia continuously, doing cross-border business 
and visiting relatives and friends living on both sides 
of the border (interviews with a Sierra Leonean in 
the Voice of America camp, Monrovia, and a group of 
women with Liberian and Guinean origin in Kailahun, 
May 2018). The help of relatives and friends in starting 
a business was greatly needed for those who returned. 
At the beginning of the return process, there were 
incidences where returnees were mobbed and some 
even killed by their own brothers (Mayor of Kenema 
City Council, April 2018). There was an obvious need 
for reconciliation (see chapter below).
The return of refugees, IDPs and fighters after 
war frequently does not mean return to the previous 
way of life or the same place of living. Marriages 
brought couples to a different place; family members 
staying in the neighbouring countries enabled  
returned refugees to keep not only family links, but 
also maintain trade connections across borders.  
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From the perspective of the communities that 
had received returnees, not only returning refugees 
and IDPs, but also former fighters came back and  
reintegrated into civilian life. Looking into reintegra-
tion hence requires considering all these groups. 
Moreover, these categories of IDP, refugee and 
ex-combatant cannot be allotted unequivocally to 
each individual. Many adolescents and children were 
first displaced and became IDPs or refugees fleeing to 
Liberia and then were caught by the RUF or the NPLF 
and recruited into the armed groups. Others joined 
the Kamajors or the army after having been displaced 
for some time. Hence, numerous people belonged to 
different ‘categories’—IDP, refugee in the neighbour-
ing country, fighter, soldier, (temporary) returnee, etc.—
during the war and some years after. 
Some ex-combatants were even eligible for DDR 
programmes. After having submitted their guns, they 
were prepared for a return to civilian life. The soldiers 
of the AFRC (Martin, 2003), fighters of the RUF, CDF 
including the Kamajors (Solomon & Ginifer, 2008) and 
fighters that had joined a “breakaway army” called 
“People’s Army” were eligible for the DDR programmes. 
The latter had a segment in the bush from where 
they attacked people on the road and robbed them 
(former Kamajor, Kenema, April 2018). After having 
participated in the programmes,12  they returned to 
their home village, a town in their home region or to 
Freetown. The National Commission for Social Action 
(NaCSA), established according to the Lomé Peace 
Accord, was in charge of reintegrating these ex-com-
batants. A programme officer reported that NaCSA 
had provided the returning ex-fighters with food and 
non-food items and engaged some in skills trainings 
according to their choice (interview in Freetown, May 
2018). In Kenema, for example, some ex-combatants 
built houses for their families (MRD chairman, Kenema, 
April 2018).
12 \  The first DDR programme took place in 1998; interruptions due to 
renewed fighting led to further programmes that finally ended in 2002. 
In total, 72,500 ex-combatants participated in the DDR programmes 
(Solomon & Ginifer, 2008).
Specifics of the reintegration of ex-combatants
When the war ended, the Sierra Leonean army 
consisted of about 17,000 soldiers and had hardly any 
structures such as barracks and offices. In 2000, the 
British downsized the military and discharged 7,000 
soldiers. They trained the remaining soldiers and  
established recruitment and careers based on merit, 
not on identity. However, military logistics, accom-
modation and equipment have remained poor until 
the time of writing. In hindsight, a colonel held that 
the reform could have been more successful “if the 
military had established farming battalions, used 
tractors from China and revived agriculture with 
cheap labour from the military” (a lieutenant colonel, 
Kenema, April 2018). The idea that Sierra Leone could 
have become self-reliant if the reconstruction and 
rebuilding of the state had been planned differently 
was shared by further intellectuals. However, these 
debates are beyond the scope of this Paper.
The reintegration of ex-combatants who had 
joined the RUF was the most difficult. Many of them 
never returned to the districts they originated from, 
for fear of reprisal. They joined the DDR programme 
to get food, money or equipment to start a business or 
to be trained in courses for three to six months. The 
Nigerian soldiers of ECOMOG initiated a motorbike 
taxi business in 1999/2000, which many ex-combatants 
took up after finishing the DDR programme. Riding 
motorbike taxis became the main livelihood opportu-
nity for ex-combatants in Sierra Leone (Peters, 2007). 
It was a way to avoid return.
In the villages, the reintegration of former fighters 
sometimes worked because their labour was urgently 
needed. A process of reconciliation happened along-
side hard work (see chapter on reconciliation below). 
The following example highlights how ex-combatants 
perceived reintegration in hindsight (see Box 5).
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who did not know their past. The story of a former  
Kamajor who has been a secondary school teacher in 
Kenema since 2005 is a case in point. He stated, “DDR 
was about making up our mind and forget our fight-
ing.” He recalled how he became a fighter in the 1990s 
and why he left the armed group (see Box 6).
Apparently, the DDR programme was not made 
for peasants but rather for those former fighters who 
did not return to the villages but preferred to stay in 
towns. There, a large variety of skills was needed to 
specialise in fields where there was not too much 
competition.
Among civilians, the perception towards DDR 
beneficiaries has remained negative. Even today, 
many still consider it unfair that as war victims,  
people remained empty-handed whereas war  
perpetrators received training, equipment and money 
(interviews in Kenema province, April and May 2018). 
Numerous former fighters never returned to their 
home areas but preferred to stay in towns in Sierra 
Leone, sometimes to start a new life among people 
Box 5  
Role of DDR programmes for former fighters returning to 
their home village
A former RUF combatant claimed that returning had been his desire. 
He had had a forest before the war and yearned to cultivate it “to forget 
about the past”. When he arrived, the forest was overgrown. Villagers 
who had money, including the chief, paid for brushing their fields; he 
could get some income for doing the work. There were also “work clubs” 
in which he participated. He enjoys working on the farms and got the 
responsibility to organise all agricultural work in the village such as 
clearing an area with the youth or brushing a piece of land (RUF 
ex-combatant, Baiwala, May 2018).
The former fighters who returned had participated in a DDR 
programme before. For some of the fighters with a rural origin who  
returned, the skills they learned during the programme did not match 
the requirements of peasant life. One former RUF fighter explained:
“DDR brought many skills. What you can afford, you can learn. I could 
not afford any of the training because of the short time—six months—
while I had a family to care for. The kits we received were not sufficient. 
The programme did not keep what it had promised. I got a disarma-
ment card and the right to a dwelling place with three rooms, parlour 
and a toilet and some dollars.” 
Another former fighter showed his card which indicated that he had 
received 60,000 SLL (USD 31) per month for six months. He added 
that the programme provided some equipment according to the skills 
learnt. However, although he had been trained in tailoring, he neither 
received a sewing machine, any other equipment necessary for the trade 
nor any payment in the end. Hence, he returned to farming like most 
displaced people after returning to their village.
Box 6  
Reflections of a former Kamajor
[During the 1980s and 1990s,] the leaders did not rightfully dispense 
justice, and we were not given our rights in courts. The youth was driven 
out of the villages. We had no democracy. Even when fuel prices  
doubled in Sierra Leone, nobody would move, whereas in Nigeria, key 
stakeholders were leading demonstrations against the high fuel price. 
We never participated in peaceful demonstrations. The APC was the 
single ruling party and won through ballot stuffing. When this hap-
pened for a long time, people wanted war. Why had we fought for inde-
pendence? We had all these minerals and diamonds and could be self- 
reliant. But the minerals were mismanaged and the leaders cheated the 
population. The diamond companies exploited the minerals, and the 
leaders built big houses abroad. The elders have managed the resources 
wrongly. They had Kangaroo courts where you just paid and had no 
rights. All this, we fought against. 
We started fighting as volunteers. Although we all risked our lives in 
fighting and were sleeping on the road, we were belittled by the com-
manders. We got tired with the ‘yes Sir’ business. I made up my mind 
to leave them and once I could, I left. To be disarmed you had to have at 
least one gun. The senior commanders took the arms from the juniors. 
They were just evil. 
Hinga Norman [the leader of the Kamajor and Minister of Defence in 
1996] was taken to the Special Court on trial. Many people did not ap-
preciate what the Kamajors did. Some bad things happened, as every-
where. This led to prejudices against all Kamajors. The positive impact 
of transformation was that we got civilian employment. It is different 
from working with commanders. We became self-reliant. Our character 
has been moulded. Other people recognise you because of what you are 
doing. Therefore you will not want them to know what you did in the 
past. I did not tell anyone.
It is frustrating for people who were not given the opportunity [of a 
DDR programme with all its benefits, in particular professional train-
ing, because senior commanders took the weapons from the juniors]. 
We share with them and give them money. I know where they are, and 
we sit together, eat together and share. I say, ‘let’s share’, and I buy 
food and we all eat together without discrimination. This contributed 
to my popularity. … We had 150 ex-combatant students in the poly-
technic. I held public meetings, and they encouraged me to stand for 
the chair of the Teachers’ Union.” 
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This statement reveals that a major motive of 
armed fighting among the Kamajors was resistance 
against the corrupt APC regime. As a traditional 
Mende institution, there was an element of ethnic 
belonging, which the SLPP Minister of Defence mobi-
lised to make the Kamajors the main security force of 
the government under Kabbah (after the election of 
1996). The statement further points to the exploita-
tion by the senior commanders and the resentment 
that was looming against the lucky ones that benefitted 
from the DDR programme. The interview partner 
benefitted greatly from being trained as a teacher 
during the programme. He considered this as the  
crucial experience that changed him into a civilian 
able to use political ways of making an impact on 
society. However, he kept his past a secret, even  
towards his wife and children. Out of a sentiment of 
fairness, he tries to share with those ex-combatants 
who did not get such a chance.
Disintegration has been the solution for many 
war perpetrators and displaced people that never 
returned or returned to towns where they hide their 
past. If not physically, some of them—like the above 
former Kamajor—have disintegrated, mentally chip-
ping experiences and acts of the past from their 
personality.
Several ex-combatants claimed that terrible war 
experiences and the following DDR programmes had 
enlightened them fundamentally. In Baiwala, a group 
of former fighters suggested that they could help in 
DDR programmes in other parts of Africa. They said 
that they understood the feelings and needs of 
ex-combatants very well due to their own experience 
and would thus be able to convince others to stop 
fighting (interview, May 2018). But still, suspicions, 
misunderstandings and differences that had  
occurred during the war have remained unsolved, 
and many people still try to conceal such feelings. 
Conflicts over election results as in 2018 again bring 
to light these differences and open old wounds that 
had been gradually healing after the war (interview 
with a pastor, Kenema, April 2018).
To sum up, the DDR programme was an impor-
tant incentive for the fighters to submit their weap-
ons and undergo a process that was meant to help 
them divest themselves from a militant behaviour 
and attitude. However, the DDR programme hardly 
reached those children and youth that had been 
working for armed groups in ancillary jobs, although 
many of them also had become militarised in their 
thinking and behaviour despite the fact that they did 
not carry guns. The most serious shortcoming was 
that the government of Sierra Leone considered the 
reduction of the threats from non-state armed groups 
as most urgent and focused on the disarmament 
while putting little efforts in the reintegration of 
former fighters. The funding agencies, too, prioritised 
demobilisation and disarmament and spent most of 
the available funds on these processes, as they could 
easily visualise success by numbers—unlike reinte-
gration efforts that did not yield success data rapidly. 
The outcomes of the reintegration of former 
fighters is discussed further below in the context of 
the reconciliation process.
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For the majority of displaced civilians, local inte-
gration in the neighbouring countries occurred due 
to marriage, jobs or business. Some Sierra Leoneans 
reported that initially, rural relatives would not  
accept a Liberian in the family. According to a teacher 
in Kenema, “people never loved my wife”, who was a 
Liberian. His family disagreed with the marriage and 
wanted him to take a wife from his home village. As a 
result, his wife mostly stayed in Liberia, since her 
mother had died to manage the family’s land there. 
She came back to Kenema from time to time. Other 
interview partners reported that in Kenema town, 
life was cheaper, and the urban relatives would accept 
Liberian wives. Often not only their own children 
stayed in Kenema to go to school, but even some 
relatives of the wives would send their children for 
education. In Kenema, living together with Liberians 
appeared to be normal and problems were rare (inter-
view with Sierra Leonean husbands of Liberian wives 
in Kenema, April 2018). 
Many Liberians were staying in areas where 
there used to be refugee camps in eastern Sierra Leone. 
These areas became part of the local communities, 
and newcomers could even get a plot of land if they 
asked for it. They were integrated and cultivated their 
land like the Sierra Leoneans. Some Liberians found 
it difficult to live in Sierra Leone, as the community 
was not very open, in particular, if they needed help. 
They returned and remained in Liberia (primary 
school teacher, Kenema, April 2018). For many, inte-
gration between Liberians and Sierra Leoneans started 
in the Guinean camps where their children received 
common schooling and the two groups lived closely 
together. For those who intermarried or decided for 
other reasons to locally integrate in the neighbouring 
country, the process of integration was mostly fruitful 
due to low cultural, social and language barriers.  
International assistance was generous and covered 
health care, education, vocational training and cash; 
some refugees remained beneficiaries until 2018—
more than 16 years after the end of the war. 
Many Liberians came to Kenema from Freetown, 
Bo or Kono and established businesses. The mayor 
of Kenema city council stated, “here we do not have 
any problem with nationality. Nobody needs a pass-
port. We are all one people” (interview in Kenema, 
April 2018), alluding to the ECOWAS citizens that 
can freely cross borders between the member states. 
According to a colonel,
we have never had much. Sierra Leonean people  
accept this as normal. The average citizen will not 
want to disrupt tranquillity. Peace is ultimate,  
better than everything else. On this basis we inte-
grate (interview with a lieutenant colonel in Kenema, 
April 2018).
The scarcity of resources and services apparently 
did not prevent Liberians from staying in Sierra 
Leone and vice versa, as the conditions were similar 
in both countries. According to the chairman of the 
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) 
in Kenema, Sierra Leoneans were frequently moving 
between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Liberians were 
members of civil society organisations in Sierra 
Leone and participated in human rights trainings. 
They were elected chairpersons of NGOs like any  
Sierra Leonean (interview in Kenema, April 2018).  
On 30 June 2012, the cessation clause was in-
voked for refugees from Liberia on the basis that  
Liberia had enjoyed many years of peace and stabil-
ity after the end of the civil war (officer of NaCSA, 
July 2018). Officially, refugee protection was no 
longer needed according to Article 1C of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and Article I.4 of the 1969 OAU 
Convention. In 2018, the refugee population of 439 
individuals staying in Sierra Leone consisted of 
Liberians, Ivorians, Malian and Sudanese nationals 
who were exempted from the cessation clause. This 
group, of which the majority were Liberians, was 
disinterested in local integration. However, this  
remained the only viable option as there was no 
prospect for resettlement opportunities, and they 
were unwilling or unable to return to their home 
countries (NaCSA officer, July 2018).13 
13 \  The United States accounted for more than 75 per cent of Liberian 
refugees who were resettled from West Africa, whilst Australia,  
Canada, Germany, Italy and France accounted for 25 per cent (NaCSA 
officer, July 2018).
Local integration and non-integration  
of Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia
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Each family received a two-room house with bath-
room and kitchen, a bag of rice, some assorted items, 
and USD 250. UNHCR paid for the construction of the 
houses and provided livelihood training and start-up 
packages including USD 250 “to make them self-suffi-
cient” (assistant UNHCR protection officer) as no  
further assistance would be provided to them. The 
measure was completed in 2008 (assistant protection 
officer of UNHCR, May 2018). The government of Liberia 
offered the locally integrated refugees to stay as long 
as they wanted and even to bequeath the houses to 
their descendants; only in case of return to Sierra  
Leone, they should hand over the houses and plots to 
the government (assistant UNHCR protection officer, 
May 2018). Meanwhile, most of the locally integrated 
Sierra Leoneans have rented out or sold the houses 
and moved to Monrovia, which actually is against  
the interest of the government to keep them under 
control (interview with assistant UNHCR protection 
officer in Monrovia, May 2018). 
Providing locally integrating Sierra Leoneans 
with land is an ambiguous endeavour, though, as 
land is highly contested in Liberia. In Blama C, a site 
close to Monrovia, 27 acres were allotted to the local 
integration estate and access to further land for  
gardening or even a grave had to be negotiated and 
paid for. The local pump was controlled by the Liberian 
inhabitants who determined when the Sierra  
Leoneans were allowed to fetch water. Constant fear 
of being displaced again was rampant among the  
Sierra Leoneans there (interview with former camp 
chairman, Monrovia, May 2018). In Samukai, the land 
that the government of Liberia had allocated to  
UNHCR for the establishment of refugee camps dur-
ing the war became contested when the Liberian plot 
owners returned from where they had sought refuge 
during the war in 2007 and 2008. They put corner-
stones demarcating their plots, started to build houses 
and displaced the refugees whom they considered 
How refugees perceive such a situation of staying 
in limbo is presented here by the example of 374  
Sierra Leoneans in Liberia who had been in protracted 
displacement for close to twenty years. According to 
the chairman of Samukai camp, the LRRRC14  “just 
keep people, raise their hope, and then leave them 
suspended.” These individuals were left from a ‘case-
load’ of 4,786 Sierra Leonean refugees staying in Liberia 
who refused to be repatriated. They were living in the 
former refugee camps of Samukai, VoA (Voice of 
America plot) and Banjoi, increasingly mixing with 
Liberian inhabitants (interview with former camp 
chairman in Monrovia, May 2018). UNHCR provided 
medical facilities until the status of ‘camp’ terminated 
in 2004. Since then, refugees have had to seek treat-
ment like Liberian citizens and pay for it except in 
cases of life-threatening diseases. In such cases, a 
partner agency provided assistance on a case-by-case 
basis as long as refugees were not locally integrated 
(interview with assistant UNHCR protection officer 
in Monrovia, May 2018).
The solution favoured by UNHCR for this group of 
Sierra Leonean refugees was local integration in Liberia, 
for which the government of Liberia had identified 
five ‘integration communities’ in different parts of 
the country.15  UNHCR and the LRRRC reached an the 
agreement with these communities to offer plots of 
land for 2,100 refugees. The Liberian government built 
houses for the refugees and per 100 houses for refu-
gees, 20 houses for the community, market structures, 
classroom extensions, clinics and town halls to be 
used by the community. The refugees could also receive 
farmland upon request from the local chiefs. UNHCR 
gave priority to large families, physically impaired, 
single mother families and other vulnerable groups.
 
14 \  The government of Liberia set up the LRRRC in 1993 to provide ”inter-
national   protection for refugees and other people of concern” (LRRRC, 
no year) in collaboration  with the United Nations Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR).  
15 \  These are Blama C in Boradville near Monrovia, Sinje in Grand Cape, 
Tenine and Sass Town in Bomi county, and a low-cost village in  
Bensonville.
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believed in the continuous threat by former fighters 
including the Kamajors that could even cross the  
border easily and harm the refugees in acts of  
revenge (focus group discussion with Sierra Leonean 
refugees and their leaders in Monrovia, May 2018). 
Another important reason why Sierra Leonean refu-
gees opted for resettlement and did not want to locally 
integrate were the atrocities committed by the LURD 
in the refugee camps in 2002/2003, which still had 
traumatic effects on them (personal communication 
by former camp chairman, Samukai, May 2018).
These refugees had lost years of their life waiting. 
As their identification cards issued to them by UNHCR 
in collaboration with LRRRC had expired since 2007, 
they repeatedly faced security harassment and  
demands for payment at checkpoints while travelling 
from one part of the country to another (interviews 
in Sinje, Cape Mount County, May 2018). In 2011, and 
again in 2017, the LRRRC had informed each individual 
about the decision that their refugee status had been 
finally denied as Sierra Leone had successfully held 
democratic elections followed by a peaceful change of 
government so that the country had to be considered 
peaceful and safe. Claims that refugees still feared 
acts of revenge by Kamajors were rejected as no longer 
valid so many years after the war (information taken 
from letters refugees showed the author in Monrovia, 
May 2018; confirmed by LRRRC representatives in a 
focus group discussion in Monrovia, May 2018; con-
firmed by assistant UNHCR protection officer). 
The LRRRC representatives explained the deci-
sion to no longer recognise the refugee status of Sierra 
Leoneans in Liberia against the backdrop of a short-
age of funds of UNHCR, which also had led to the can-
cellation of assistance. This also affected about 5,000 
Liberian refugees who were still scattered in different 
West African countries. To solve the refugee issue,  
the newly elected Liberian government formed an 
Asylum Committee consisting of representatives of 
the Ministries of internal affairs, justice, foreign  
affairs, finance and development planning in 2018 for 
which the LRRRC acted as secretariat and UNHCR 
participated as observer (focus group discussion with 
squatters. The displaced people had to find room 
between the houses of the other ‘squatters’ (observed 
during a visit of the former camp; confirmed by Libe-
rian neighbours, May 2018). Some plot owners went to 
court. Several Sierra Leoneans left the former camp 
and built houses in the surrounding community. The 
houses are similar to the houses of Liberians but 
more congested (interview with former camp chair-
man, Monrovia, May 2018). In Sinje, the Liberian 
government had secured 75 acres of land for the local 
integration of Sierra Leonean families. When deeds 
were being prepared for the land, there were sugges-
tions that a representative of the integrated commu-
nity be signatory to the deed. The LRRRC refused this, 
making the legal use of the land highly questionable 
(interview in Sinje, May 19, 2018). In the former VOA 
camp, Liberian local inhabitants bought the land on 
which some Sierra Leoneans were still staying in 
tents (interview with refugees in VOA, June 2018). 
The documentation of the legal integration of  
Sierra Leoneans through passports, national identifi-
cation cards, etc. was still far from completion in 2018, 
putting their status in limbo. Hence, they received 
the approval to integrate in Liberia without any sup-
porting document from the government attesting the 
approval (interviews in Monrovia and Sinje, 2018). 
From the perspective of UNHCR, the reason for the 
unfinished local integration process was the slow 
issuance of residence permits, travel documents or 
Liberian citizenship documents by the Liberian  
government. Some documents apparently went 
missing. A UNHCR representative emphasised that  
UNHCR was prepared to take over all costs, including 
those for integration tests, medical check, police 
clearance as well as court fees for legal procedures 
and had already paid for 1,718 passports (assistant 
UNHCR protection officer in Monrovia, May 2018).
The small number of Sierra Leoneans who  
refused to be repatriated or move to local integration 
communities feared acts of revenge, had lost the 
whole family or lacked any positive connection to 
any of the two countries due to war and experiences 
of violence as refugees or trauma. They strongly 
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property and start to build houses. A few camp  
inhabitants were displaced and had to move to 
the houses of others in the same camp, which 
only can be a temporary solution.
5\ Sierra Leoneans who did not agree to return or 
locally integrate and still are staying in the former 
camps (still hoping for a resettlement solution). 
According to them, it is unclear when and how 
their cases will be solved.
6\ Former Sierra Leonean ECOMOG soldiers (and 
their families), based in Liberia opposite the free 
port. Their role had been to protect the Liberians. 
Whereas some have been locally integrated, 
others refuse this solution out of fear of being 
pursued in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, in parti-
cular, when Charles Taylor will die and anti-Sierra 
Leonean and anti-ECOMOG sentiments are likely 
to rise again (focus group discussion with former 
ECOMOG soldiers in Monrovia, May 2018).
For all these groups, the LRRRC offers local inte-
gration in Liberia—provided that UNHCR will be 
funding the documentation and housing facilities. 
Whereas the LRRRC claims that the process was  
delayed because the government of Liberia had a 
shortage of funds (focus group discussion with LRRRC 
representatives in Monrovia, May 2018), UNHCR 
claimed to have paid for the 2,100 locally integrated 
refugees and was ready to provide the funds for the 
remaining caseload of 376 individuals as soon as the 
documentation is submitted by the LRRRC. The funds 
would cover all document fees related to residence 
permits or naturalisation as well as work permits 
(interview with assistant UNHCR protection officer 
in Monrovia, May 2018). On 23 July 2018, the President  
of Liberia, George M. Weah, led the official presenta-
tion of naturalisation certificates to 50 former Sierra 
Leonean refugees, which took place at Benton City, 
Monrovia (Montserrado) as part of the celebration of 
Independence Day (26 July 2018) activities.  
five LRRRC representatives, Monrovia, May 2018). On 
10 April 2018, UNHCR and the LRRRC called the  
remaining 376 Sierra Leonean refugees (105 family 
heads) again to verify their status on a case-by-case 
basis (focus group discussion with LRRRC represent-
atives in Monrovia, May 2018). UNHCR representatives 
confirmed that all these individuals might opt for  
local integration or assisted repatriation, whereas 
resettlement was no option as no country was ready 
to receive any Sierra Leonean refugee (interview with 
assistant UNHCR protection officer in Monrovia, May 
2018). 
To sum up, the following categories of refugees 
can be distinguished with regard to legal status and 
options for solutions.
1\ An undocumented number of Sierra Leoneans 
who integrated voluntarily in Liberia; these are 
mostly individuals who intermarried with 
Liberians.
2\ Sierra Leonean refugees who opted for local inte-
gration and were relocated to Liberian communi-
ties without receiving legal documents. They fear 
problems when they want to travel, conclude 
contracts, sell and buy plots or houses, bequeath 
property to their descendants or vote in national 
elections.
3\ A number of Sierra Leonean refugees who opted 
for local integration upon pressure by the LRRRC 
and UNHCR and were promised to be naturalised 
as Liberian citizens but have never received any 
legal documents stating their status as residents. 
This has consequences for title deeds and inheri-
tance cases that may lead to disputes and very  
likely to the loss of rights of undocumented  
former Sierra Leonean refugees (as in 2.).
4\ Sierra Leoneans who agreed to be locally integrated 
but are still staying in the former refugee camps. 
It is unclear whether they will be relocated and 
when. Some come under pressure as the Liberian 
owners of the former camp land that the Liberian 
government had allocated to UNHCR claim their 
BETWEEN RECONCILIATION, RESIGNATION AND REVENGE \ E. GRAWERT  
26 \ \ WORKING PAPER 8  \ 2019
Interim conclusion
Coming back to Assumption I, the overview and 
perceptions provided in this chapter confirm that 
reconstruction, restitution of land and / or property, 
basic rights and equal protection by the state for 
returnees and IDPs were core conditions for reinte-
gration. Moreover, the chapter showed that there is 
no reason to exclude former fighters and locally inte-
grated former refugees from these demands. Civilians 
expressed resentments against the preferential treat-
ment of former fighters through DDR programmes 
that provided them with superior starting conditions 
compared with war victims. This injustice requires 
further considerations in future DDR programmes  
or eventually, alternative approaches to changing 
people’s minds and abilities from a war setting to a 
peaceful way of solving conflicts and civilian skills. 
The chapter also showed that the common ECOWAS 
citizenship alleviates a process of creating equal 
conditions for all those living in the same country, 
including participation in civil society activities and 
elections as chairpersons of NGOs. 
According to Assumption II, besides livelihood  
opportunities, local integration requires a permanent 
legal status and for some, additional social, psycho-
logical, cultural or political requirements. Continuous 
cross-border movement in the region fosters trans- 
local integration. All parts of this assumption were 
confirmed showing that integration needs are  
diverse and cannot be fulfilled by blueprints trying to 
cover every group equally. Even more than fifteen 
years after the end of the wars, people had remained 
in limbo, stuck in bureaucracy, waiting for a final 
solution about a place where they could legally stay. 
People in this situation were frustrated and showed 
signs of deep resignation. Yet, many Sierra Leoneans 
and Liberians were able to integrate without any  
external assistance, facilitated by the freedom of 
movement. This experience strongly suggests sup-
porting further attempts of regional political integra-
tion in Africa.
The increasing movement of refugees to  
countries of first asylum has entailed that receiving 
governments have become reluctant to facilitate local 
integration. “Local integration carries with it a con-
notation of permanence as well as security problems 
and resource burdens” (interview with an officer of 
NaCSA in Freetown, July 2018). The failure to find  
acceptable durable solutions has resulted in increasing 
numbers of protracted displacement situations 
worldwide. To overcome these situations, the NaCSA 
officer suggested developing an African resettlement 
model within various African countries (statement by 
Alhaji Nurudeen, NaCSA, for the Stakeholder Work-
shop, July 2018).
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Reconciliation through the TRC  
and outcomes for reintegration
The TRC conducted a comprehensive reconcilia-
tion process between the remaining war perpetrators 
and the victims. The Commission thoroughly docu-
mented the abuses and human rights violations com-
mitted during the war and investigated the causes, 
context and actors involved. The aim was to restore 
the dignity of the victims, and to create “a climate 
which fosters constructive interchange between  
victims and perpetrators” (TRC, 2004, Section 6.2b). 
The TRC considered sixteen specified criminal acts 
subsumed under the categories of violations perpe-
trated in the context of abduction and outside  
abduction, mistreatment violations and economic 
violations. Under these categories the TRC investi-
gated killings, forced recruitment, cannibalism, 
forced cannibalism, forced labour, assault, physical 
torture and rape, arbitrary detention, looting, extor-
tion and destruction of property (TRC, 2004). 
The review of the TRC revealed that the atrocities 
committed during the war had not only destroyed  
individual lives, families and communities, people's 
belief systems and cultural heritages, but also demol-
ished and desecrated traditional and community 
meeting spaces and institutions as people had been 
forced to desecrate symbols of their religion or faith. 
Certain groups like property owners, chiefs, tradi-
tional authorities and representatives of government 
institutions had been targeted on the basis of revenge, 
economic appropriation and because of their ethnicity 
(TRC, 2004). Ethnicity was an issue that all factions 
used as an instrument of prejudice and violence 
against perceived opponents or those who did not 
'belong' as is shown with the documentation of the 
violations committed by the three main groups of 
perpetrators (see Box 7).
This chapter starts from the assumption that a 
reconciliation process enables people living in a com-
munity to go beyond a mere co-existence with those 
who return from abroad, other parts of the country 
and from fighting. It examines to which extent the 
reconciliation process in Sierra Leone laid the foun-
dation to prevent acts of revenge, thus encouraging 
refugees and IDPs to return. 
War perpetrators were extremely numerous and 
many could hardly be held accountable as they were 
adolescents and children forcibly recruited and 
drugged by various armed groups. A number of perpe-
trators of war crimes as well as members of the RUF 
were imprisoned after the 'Peace Task Force', a squad 
of armed vigilantes from various factions of Sierra Le-
one’s security forces, had raided, arrested and de-
tained anyone associated with the RUF they could get 
hold of in 2000. For the top leaders perpetrating 
crimes against humanity, UN Resolution 1315 put 
into force the Special Court of Sierra Leone through 
sub-section 4 (40), which dealt with thirteen large-
scale war criminals. Further war perpetrators had left 
Sierra Leone and hid abroad. Hence, there was only a 
very limited prosecutorial aspect comprising only 
those that were considered to bear the greatest  
responsibility for the gross human rights violations 
during the war.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
set up according to Article IX of the Lomé Peace 
Agreement of 7 July 1999 and operating in parallel to 
the Special Court trials, had a different approach that 
focused on restorative justice. The purposes of the 
TRC were 
to create an impartial historical record of violations 
and abuses of human rights and international hu-
manitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sier-
ra Leone … to address impunity, to respond to the 
needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconcil-
iation and to prevent a repetition of the violations 
and abuses suffered”(TRC, 2004, Section 6.1).16  
16 \  Section 6 (1) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, 
adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone on 22 February, 2000, quoted 
in Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004.
Reconciliation processes and outcomes
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frequent changes of sides blurred to some extent the 
pre-war dividing line between the Mende (eastern 
and south-eastern region; mostly SLPP followers) and 
the Temne (northern region, mostly APC followers). 
Against this backdrop, returnees emphasised in inter-
views that reconciliation was necessary to continue 
life in Sierra Leone, as the following exemplary state-
ments show (see Box 8).  
Political power and justice, an open field where 
all the war-affected people can understand what had 
happened as a basis for return, and preventing revenge 
are the points that formerly displaced people are 
making here. These points substantiate the need for 
reconciliation to reintegrate fully in communities 
after return from other places in the country or 
abroad. However, equally or even more important 
were healthcare, employment, housing, security, 
transportation, food and training. Hence, from the 
The findings of the TRC highlighted the regional, 
ethnic and cultural affiliations of the armed groups 
and identify their ‘enemies’. They indicate a tendency 
of the various armed groups targeting people that 
were part of the APC networks. However, the dynam-
ics of the movement of ‘disgruntled young men’ and 
Box 7  
Perpetrators and their target groups
According to the investigations of the TRC, the RUF committed the 
majority of violations and abuses throughout the war. The armed 
group pioneered the concept of forced recruitment including children. 
The RUF was responsible ”for the widespread use of drugs by its mem-
bers, which precipitated spates of crazed violence and compounded the 
prevailing general sense of oppression and hopelessness” (TRC, 2004,  
p. 74). The group directed its attacks predominantly against the  
Lebanese, Fullahs, Mandingos, Nigerians and Marakas (TRC, 2004). 
The second-most significant perpetrator was the AFRC. The fighters of 
the AFRC committed atrocities on a massive scale in the northern  
region and in Kono District. The group “demonstrated a 'specialisa-
tion' in the practice of amputations in the period from 1998 to 1999” 
(TRC, 2004, p. 74). 
Among the groups that formed the Civil Defence Forces (CDF)1 , an  
'initiation' ceremony was practiced that entailed physical and psycho-
logical torture as well as other gross abuses of human rights. The 
Kamajors were responsible for almost all CDF violations reported  
after 1996. Only the Kamajors practiced forced cannibalism. During 
the latter part of the war, the CDF targeted people of northern origin 
that were staying in the southern and eastern regions. The Kamajors 
(belonging to the Mende) committed disproportionate levels of viola-
tions against the Temne, Koranko, Loko, Limba and Yalunka (TRC, 
2004).
The TRC identified several characteristics and tendencies that spanned 
across all armed actors in the conflict. The ground forces of all the 
armed groups consisted of “impressionable, disgruntled young men 
eager for an opportunity to assert themselves, either to ensure that no 
harm was done to their own people, to fight against perceived injustice, 
or for personal and group aggrandisement” (TRC, 2004, p. 74).  
Moreover all the militias and armed groups displayed “an astonishing 
factional fluidity … Overtly and covertly, gradually and suddenly, fighters 
switched sides or established new units on a scale unprecedented in 
any other conflict” (TRC, 2004, p. 75). 
 
1 \  The CDF was a powerful paramilitary organisation through which  the 
Minister of Defence incorporated the Kamajors in the security apparatus 
after the SLPP had regained power through the election of 1996.
Box 8  
Returnees’ views on reconciliation— 
perceptions in hindsight
"The type of atrocities that befell the country during the war by different 
warring factions through the cutting of human parts and the burning 
down of houses caused too much mayhem and therefore reconciliation 
was necessary. … For my return, healthcare, employment, housing and 
security were most important to me. For reconciliation, political power 
and justice were an added value to me. … Return and repatriation must 
be facilitated in an open field and with the involvement of all people,  
be it civilians, ex-fighters, government and development agencies so 
that those in involved in the war—perpetrators of the war as well as 
victims—can understand and be able to establish the reasons why and 
how they can return and be repatriated in their normal or original 
place” (lecturer, returned to his home area, Freetown, April 2018).
“The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) was at the fore-
front of the return and reintegration programme—building refugee 
camps, providing transportation and feeding packages to war-affected 
and war-wounded victims and training refugees so that they gained 
skills to empower themselves at the end” (chief in a suburb of Kenema, 
originating from a village in the same region, May 2018).
“Considering how brutally the war was fought I do think reconciliation 
is necessary or else we would have ever remained in the war of revenge. 
… Reconciliation was good and possible” (housewife, originating from 
the northern region, staying in Freetown since displacement during the 
war, April 2018). 
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perspective of people who were displaced during the 
war, food supply, social services, security and employ-
ment accompanied by a reconciliation process are 
the conditions required for return and reintegration. 
(Legitimate) political power, justice and security can 
be understood as aims to which a reconciliation  
process can contribute by putting an end to revenge. 
In Sierra Leone, revenge was the main means to 
act upon the perceived unfair and unjust occupation 
of influential positions and the abuse of power of 
privileged individuals. Revenge occurs in at least 
three dimensions: As 'mob justice' that is encouraged 
when the judicial system is not functioning and abuses 
of power take place without any chance of holding 
the power holders accountable—in a nutshell, when 
the rule of law is non-existent. Second, revenge is a 
means to forge groups of people together against  
perceived enemies. Third, with revenge, followers can 
be mobilised even out of the self-interest of the mobi-
liser to engage in economic appropriation or taking 
over a powerful position. 
In its reconciliation efforts, the TRC thus had  
to face the challenge of transforming attitudes 
informed by multi-dimensional revenge into atti-
tudes suitable of establishing social cohesion after 
the war. This was aggravated by the fact that during 
the eleven years of war, there was a whole generation 
that never went to school and children and youth had 
survived by carrying guns. Therefore, the government 
of Sierra Leone established the Ministry of Youth  
and Sports immediately after the election of 2002 to 
enhance educational opportunities for the ‘lost  
generation’. The ministry fostered numerous initia-
tives and programmes for the youth—stayees and  
returned IDPs and refugees alike—that mostly were 
implemented by NGOs (TRC, 2004). The National  
Commission for DDR also addressed mainly the 
youth in its effort to disarm and demobilise combat-
ants. According to a former reintegration officer, the 
DDR programme included an element of counselling 
among some provisions meant to enable the ex-com-
batants to make a living: 
Sensitisation messages and incentives—handouts 
that made them comfortable and training—were  
provided to the ex-combatants so that they could  
forget about the war. We even gave them psycho- 
social counselling, for which we employed civil society 
organisations. They got accommodation, health kits, 
food and monthly allowances to engage in training, 
tool kits and a reintegration package of SLL 300,000 
(USD 156). This kept them busy. Many became 
self-employed as motorbike taxi drivers, masons, 
carpenters, welders, tailors, in IT and in agriculture 
(former project officer for reintegration of ex-combatants, 
Freetown, May 2018).
However, according to an evaluation of the DDR 
programmes in Sierra Leone, the ex-combatants  
considered the encampment period as 
too short to effect any substantial and sustained 
change in behaviour and attitudes, and [was], in 
some cases, certainly too short to break up existing 
command and control structures amongst the armed  
factions (Solomon & Ginifer, 2008, p. 12). 
Commanders continued to have power over their 
followers. In addition, the opportunity of learning a 
trade during the DDR programme was very limited. 
There were no funds to provide sufficient options for 
the youth to use the acquired skills and sustain 
themselves and their families. Many ex-combatants 
left the programme inadequately trained (TRC, 2004). 
Moreover, the programme hardly reached those 
children and youth who had been working for armed 
groups in ancillary jobs. According to an old pastor, 
what was given to them instead of guns was skills 
training for six months. They found themselves being 
left out. They could no longer go to school as they 
were too old. Most elders in their families had died. 
They were ‘leaders’ in their communities without any 
foundation. When they returned from the war, they 
were decision-makers, although they were illiterate, 
had no money and could not develop a farm. They 
have a lot of family responsibilities. The motorbike 
business became a way of making quick money. But 
what will they be after five years, when other means 
of transport may replace the motorbikes? The 
ex-combatants are a lost generation (interview,  
Kenema, April 2018). 
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Many fighters started a business as motorbike 
taxi drivers after they had participated in DDR  
programmes, and only a few completed school or  
vocational training (Peters, 2007). Together with  
orphans becoming petty traders and other youth 
dropping out of education due to displacement,  
former fighters, in particular child soldiers, added to 
the large number of youth between 14 and 35 who 
were lacking any sustainable livelihood perspective 
after the war. This group contained drug addicts and 
many individuals who could easily be mobilised 
again for doing the ‘dirty work’ of politicians and other 
jobs paid for by disgruntled potential leaders as it had 
been the case before the war (Abdullah, 1998). 
The commitment to the process of reintegration 
that had to follow disarmament was low on the part 
of the government as well as international agencies. 
Therefore, the reintegration of ex-combatants  
succeeded or failed according to the extent, to which 
the receiving community had suffered from atrocities 
and according to the degree the ex-combatants had 
committed violations (Sesay & Suma, 2009). The  
reintegration of ex-combatant children and youth 
was particularly difficult as their families frequently 
rejected them because of their affiliations with the 
various armed groups. This fact reveals most clearly 
the importance of reconciliation for reintegration.
Based on its comprehensive historical analysis, 
the TRC initiated a process that was directed to the 
establishment of accountability, acknowledgment, 
truth-telling and reparations at national, community 
and individual levels. A sensitisation of specific 
groups of victims and perpetrators was meant to 
encourage them to partake in reconciliation activities 
that comprised particular reconciliation ceremonies 
and distinct memorial ceremonies. Reaching truth 
through broad-based participation would permit the 
nation to examine itself honestly and taking effective 
measures to prevent a repetition of the past (TRC, 
2004). To this end, the TRC collected 9,000 statements 
from victims of war in Freetown and twelve provin-
cial districts. More than 450 perpetrators exposed 
their deeds in public and asked for forgiveness (some 
only ceremonially, though). Others shirked the  
process posing as refugees eligible for resettlement 
(Kelsall, 2005). According to the mayor of Kenema City 
Council, 
leaders that connived with the rebels escaped and 
were not tried in the Special Court or confronted by 
victims in the reconciliation process led by the TRC 
(interview in April 2018).  
Avoiding encounters of the returning Sierra  
Leoneans with the main war actors certainly contrib-
uted to the success of the reintegration of the dis-
placed and refugees (interview with a pastor, Kenema, 
April 2019). 
The combination of the Sierra Leone Special 
Court and the TRC was a way to bring war victims 
and perpetrators together to an extent that was hard 
to anticipate. However, analyses of observers revealed 
that the ‘truth’ was rarely told (Article 19, 2000;  
Kelsall, 2005). Reconciliation took the form of  
emotional rituals—but even critics held that these 
fulfilled the purpose (Kelsall, 2005). Due to institutional 
rivalries between the TRC and the Special Court, the 
TRC was not able to establish accountability for the 
atrocities that had been committed during the con-
flict as an alternative to pure criminal justice (TRC, 
2004). The result of the lack of cooperation between 
the Special Court and the TRC was impunity for  
numerous mid-range commanders and perpetrators 
that hid incognito in Sierra Leone and abroad. The 
fact that the public truth and reconciliation process 
ran in parallel to the prosecution of top war crimi-
nals behind closed doors by the Sierra Leone Special 
Court has impeded the establishment of the rule of 
law in the country. If the rule of law were in place,  
citizens could bring perpetrators to justice and would 
no longer have to revert to mutual revenge acts incited 
by politicians who get away with it without a court 
trial (Grawert, 2019).
Local and long-term reconciliation
 
In 2003, district reconciliation committees in part-
nership with the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra 
Leone as well as local church organisations took over 
the process of reconciliation. The coordinator of the 
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Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church 
in Kenema reflected on the requirements to achieve 
reconciliation and the difficulties that had to be over-
come in the violence-affected society of Sierra Leone 
(see Box 9). 
According to this statement, the TRC had focused 
mainly on one dimension of reconciliation, namely 
public confession by perpetrators and apologising to 
the victims to restore a relationship. This approach, 
however, does not correspond fully with the way Sierra 
Leoneans used to resolve conflicts and re-establish a 
peaceful co-existence. Compensation appears to be 
an important element that may preclude future acts 
of revenge. NaCSA had the right approach in this 
direction as it focused on reparations for war victims, 
paying them interim cash grants of USD 100, skills 
training for a few hundred women who had suffered 
sexual violence and housing for amputees. However, 
the authority was not prepared to take responsibility 
for the long time required to care for seriously handi-
capped persons who would never be able to  
generate an income as unskilled labourers or 
peasants. Neither did the authority receive sufficient 
state funding to become independent from interna-
tional donors.  
NaCSA was one of those state agencies that were  
notoriously involved in severe corruption affairs (as 
reported in a newspaper headline, Freetown, in July 
2018). The Coordinator of the Justice and Peace  
Commission emphasised that reconciliation takes a 
long time: 
Such a process has not been accomplished in Sierra 
Leone, even more than fifteen years after the war. We 
have only started. Establishing community healing 
programmes and memorial centres where people can 
go and remember the dead were correct moves. There 
is a mass grave in Kemena. This should become a  
memorial centre, and the government should bring 
the people together there every year. 
The role of the traditional leaders is crucial. The 
chiefs have to invite all major stakeholders to recon-
ciliation meetings. … We have not given up. We have 
to allow the process to take its own turn. We still 
have got a lot of latent divisions in our society  
(interview in Kenema, April 2018).
A Sierra Leonean NGO, Fambul Tok, took over  
long-term reconciliation efforts in 2008. Its approach 
aimed to bridge social gaps, whereas NaCSA focused 
on symbolic reparations and commemorations of 
those who died in the war, peace monuments and 
trees. Fambul Tok was funded by USAID and interna-
tional donors to conduct further reconciliation activi-
ties at the community level in those parts of Sierra  
Leone that were most affected by war atrocities. The 
NGO mainly organised reconciliation rituals of  
confession and forgiving among local inhabitants 
(Fambul Tok, 2019). Villagers would gather at the  
village centre around a fire and speak out and ask for 
forgiveness. When somebody forgives, this means 
that, according to the local tradition, the act will be 
forgiven (elder during village assembly in Bomaru, 
May 2018). In Baiwala, the inhabitants erected a 
roundabout after the ceremony in four sections of the 
village as a memorial for reconciliation. According to 
the local chief, 
it was difficult at the beginning. Most perpetrators—our 
brothers and sisters—are her among us. Clearing and 
Box 9  
Local meaning of reconciliation
“Reconciliation is a very long process that starts with the perpetrators 
and the victims. Society has to facilitate it. There is a deadlock when the 
opponent is not ready to listen to you. It can only continue when he is 
ready to talk. From the traditional point of view, we do not have a word 
for ‘reconciliation’, because in the mentality of the Sierra Leoneans, the 
fabric of society will never break. It can bend. Hence—where to start 
with reconciliation? 
In fact, there are a lot of broken relationships that have occurred during 
the war and in post-election conflicts. … One element to facilitate  
reconciliation is compensation. Another element is public confession, 
which the TRC took up during its investigation. (It consisted of)  
begging for mercy and apologising to certain individuals and showing 
that you are sorry. If you know the gravity of the wrong you have done, 
you should  put measures in place to prevent the wrong from happening 
again. Otherwise it will come back. Finally, you can start a new rela-
tionship with a good feeling and harmony. There is no need to involve a 
court” (interview with the coordinator of the Justice and Peace Com-
mission, Kenema, April 2018). 
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brushing after the war in groups of ten helped a lot so that 
we learned to live together with former fighters and build a 
neighbourhood. By working together, we can say, "look, I 
have forgiven you". There was no other way to live here. We 
drew lots to select the first one to go and start the work, 
then the second. Some were not used to talk to an ex-combat-
ant while working on his field. In any case, the owner will 
provide the soup, and each group member will give a cup of 
rice. Most of them changed their ways, but still have their 
military bearing. We cope with them. We are all engaged in 
farming now (interview in May, 2018).
Farm work and construction in mixed groups of 
war victims, ex-combatants and perpetrators, fighters 
and civilians who returned after displacement and 
the ritual reconciliation ceremonies by Fambul Tok 
and local chiefs have contributed to re-establishing 
social cohesion in the villages.
Remembering the years after the war, many  
people who had been displaced and returned believed 
that the government and international agencies were 
too lenient with war perpetrators and offered undue 
preferable treatment to them compared to the  
victims (interviews in Freetown, Kenema and  
Kailahun, May and June 2018). Sixteen years after  
the war, reconciliation thus seems still incomplete. A 
process of holding perpetrators accountable in public 
was still important for some returnees after their  
displacement. Some scholars and practitioners  
held that the legacy of incomplete reconciliation ex-
plained to some extent the rising criminality, violent 
attacks and revenge acts that occurred in particular  
in the context of national elections.17  Hence, reconcil-
iation may also be required between victims and per-
petrators of recent violent acts that occurred in the 
context of elections.
17 \  Result of discussions of academics and practitioners from NGOs du-
ring the stakeholder workshop in Freetown in July 2018; statement by 
the Coordinator of the Justice and Peace Commission, Fatorma A. 
Combey, Kenema in May 2018.
Interim conclusion
According to Assumption III, reconciliation proce-
dures bring victims and perpetrators together and  
demand confessing and forgiving; the involvement of 
ex-combatants is crucial, and reconciliation is a first 
step towards justice, but needs to be accompanied by 
putting perpetrators on trial. The study shows that  
reconciliation procedures only succeeded to a certain 
extend to bring victims and perpetrators together for  
ceremonies of confession and forgiveness. It can be 
confirmed that ex-combatants were a crucial part of 
reconciliation, and that it was equally important for 
the success of reintegration of people that returned  
after displacement that some ex-combatants avoided 
the process. As assumed, reconciliation was organised 
in parallel to court trials for perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes and was a first but 
insufficient step towards justice. Putting perpetrators 
on trial later may be a necessary consequence to avoid 
resentment among war victims in the long term. 
Assumption III also held that reconciliation should 
be regarded as part of the reintegration process as it 
may be crucial to make reintegration sustainable and 
enable community inhabitants to transcend a mere 
co-existence with the diverse groups of returnees. The 
analysis corroborates that reconciliation is an indis-
pensable part of the reintegration process in commu-
nities that incorporate victims and perpetrators and 
required to make reintegration of refugees and IDPs 
sustainable.
The assessment of Sierra Leonean scholars  
during the project’s stakeholder workshop confirmed 
that to achieve sustainable reintegration within the 
Sierra Leonean society, the conditions that preceded 
the war must be changed (workshop statement by 
Spencer, Freetown, July 2018; similarly lieutenant colo-
nel Kuna, Kenema, May 2018). This implies that over-
coming the historical divide of the Sierra Leonean soci-
ety with its deep political, regional, and ethnic biases 
has to be considered as a pre-condition for a sustaina-
ble reintegration of those large and diverse  
population groups that had been scattered inside the 
country and across its borders during the war.
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This Working Paper has shed light on (re-)integra-
tion of a broad range of population groups after the 
end of the war in Sierra Leone: Refugees, IDPs, former 
fighters who returned and reintegrated into Sierra 
Leone as well as Liberians and Sierra Leoneans who 
locally integrated into the neighbouring countries. 
The process appeared to be successful at first sight as 
no armed fighting has occurred ever since. Moreover, 
more than half a million people have returned and 
stayed in rural as well as urban areas of the country 
and managed to make a living—even if with difficul-
ties. Furthermore, thousands of displaced people have 
settled in the neighbouring countries—Sierra Leoneans 
in Liberia and Liberians in Sierra Leone. Cross-border 
movement and trade have become more important 
than ever to generate livelihood options. This latter 
finding can be an option for the few people who have 
resigned to their fate and stayed in limbo  and can 
neither reintegrate in Sierra Leone nor in Liberia, to 
advance possibilities and agreements for resettle-
ment in a third country within Africa—at least  
within the ECOWAS countries.
However,  having dug deeper by collecting per-
ceptions of different social groups in hindsight, our  
research reveals that (re-)integration does have a 
range of flaws. These were made visible through a  
review of the reconciliation processes after war.  
Reconciliation focused on ceremonial rituals of for-
giveness and reparations for most vulnerable groups 
of war victims, among them large numbers of dis-
placed people. Reparations did not reach all groups 
that had become war victims, though. Short-term 
counselling for traumatised displaced people and 
some money to re-start their lives was not sufficient 
to safeguard livelihood security in the long run or full 
reintegration of the worst-affected population groups, 
among them many who had been scattered all over 
Sierra Leone and the neighbouring countries and  
returned. Some groups did not return because they 
felt that their livelihood, and even more important, 
their very lives were not secure.  
The study has revealed that resentment among 
disadvantaged social groups was tangible still in 2018 
when they remembered the different treatment of  
displaced people, other war victims and ex-combat-
ants. The latter had not only received counselling and 
payment but got privileged access to three to six 
months of vocational training and start-up capital  
enabling many to start a small business whereas 
large population groups many of which had returned 
from short and long-term displacement had very 
precarious incomes— a difference that became clearly 
visible in hindsight. For the disadvantaged groups, 
the hope for a sustainable livelihood had dwindled 
whereas more privileged and middle-class people 
with the appropriate networks to influential politi-
cians had no reason to be worried about the future. 
Relationships between patrons and their clients, 
in particular, interfered with the deep social divide 
between lower-class and upper-class people (with 
only a small middle class). The patronage relation-
ships are split along the regional and political party 
divide, cutting right through Sierra Leone. Even local 
chiefs and religious leaders are divided by this line. 
Dependence on patrons for survival, livelihood  
options, opportunities and chances thus implied  
dependence on a political party—which inflates the 
importance of success in elections to an extent that it 
becomes “a kind of do or die affair” (Sylvanus Spencer 
during the stakeholder workshop, Freetown, July 2018). 
The patrons have the power to mobilise others to 
commit violent acts because of this existential role of 
elections. The research disclosed that these violent 
acts often are driven by sentiments of revenge stem-
ming from the historically perpetuated rigid divide 
along a political, regional and ethnic line.  
Here, our research has also shown that the 
impunity of war perpetrators has repercussions until 
present times, most visible in the recurrent election- 
related acts of violence. The statement of a publicist 
during the stakeholder workshop in Freetown high-
lights the connection as follows:
Conclusion and outlook: Overcoming processes  
of disintegration
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   \ Impunity for junior officers and commanders 
cannot last forever to prevent the consolida-
tion of a culture of impunity. 
   \ Eradicating the culture of impunity appears 
to be the first and foremost requirement for  
establishing the rule of law in Sierra Leone.  
According to King, 
the rule of law and a clear division of powers that 
make it possible to hold politicians accountable for 
their action in front of an independent judiciary need 
to be strengthened in Sierra Leone in order to avoid 
this pattern of (electoral) violence to re-emerge again 
(King, Freetown, July 2018).
Hence, unless the political, economic and social 
partition of the country is overcome, and the rule of 
law is established, tensions during elections are likely 
to trigger acts of violence and revenge again. Moreover, 
the findings of this study suggest that in turn, estab-
lishing the rule of law to hold perpetrators accounta-
ble at all levels—including the state—will be essential 
to achieve the substantial and comprehensive reinte-
gration of a society that was involved in a protracted 
armed conflict. Hence, the research findings go beyond 
Assumption IV, according to which the reintegration 
of displaced people, refugees and former fighters  
enables a society to address conflicts through mediat-
ing institutions in the long run, which then will have 
the effect of enhancing the rule of law. There must be 
a mutual process of establishing the rule of law and a 
gradual reintegration of all displaced groups includ-
ing former fighters, accompanied by reconciliation, 
reconstruction and the development of clearly fixed 
and transparent steps to eradicate post-war impunity. 
This insight entails a re-think of international  
community interventions in war-torn countries and 
suggests that peacekeeping must be succeeded by 
peacebuilding combined with development efforts 
that are directed towards establishing and consoli-
dating the rule of law. 
As an outlook with relevance for the government 
of Sierra Leone and cooperating development agen-
cies, the research findings strongly suggest that the 
conditions of living and future perspectives of the 
youth of Sierra Leone need urgent attention. Disinte-
gration not only has the historical dimension of  
The impunity of junior commanders of armed groups 
has had damaging effects on the realm of politics and 
democratic voting, as remnants of the cruel behav-
iour during war remain alive and appear to be justifi-
able for parts of the society (Nathaniel King during 
stakeholder workshop, Freetown, July 2018). 
Scholars termed the prevailing attitude “culture 
of impunity” (Spencer, Freetown, July 2018). This  
culture can also fuel electoral violence. Out of vested 
interests and striving to make political gains, leaders 
and influential well-educated individuals continue to 
manipulate others to commit violent acts, thus  
perpetuating election-related violence. These manip-
ulators are powerful individuals and politicians—
some of them former commanders and leaders  
during the war who got away with impunity. Conse-
quently, they have no interest in investigations and 
punishment of those who pulled the strings and thus 
contribute to perpetuating the culture of impunity. 
These findings and considerations (most of them 
thanks to the reflections of the scholars participating 
in the stakeholder workshop) have led to the follow-
ing conclusions:
   \ Permanent engagement is required to bring 
about reconciliation in close connection with 
the reintegration of those who return after 
displacement, as conflicts will inevitably erupt 
again.
   \ Reconciliation has to be a process that covers 
urban and rural inhabitants, those who stayed 
put as well as displaced people and is inextricably 
linked with development for making rural areas 
accessible through infrastructure.
   \ Reconciliation has to be a domestically owned 
process and should be conducted by independent 
civil society organisations that also involve 
religious leaders. The process should link  
reconciliation and reintegration of displaced 
people and refugees and take a long-term  
perspective to address persisting cleavages that 
are a legacy of war and even pre-war times. 
   \ This societal process should replace the highly 
donor-dependent government institution of 
NaCSA that—like many other state authori-
ties— can easily be corrupted.
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division that has resurfaced repeatedly in the form of 
electoral violence, but Sierra Leone also has a long 
history of exclusion of the youth that adds a genera-
tional dimension to disintegration. Apparently, this 
was exacerbated when hundreds of thousands of  
displaced people returned after the war, among them 
a large number of youth who only received insufficient 
education and employment opportunities. Subsidies 
and scholarships will be needed to fully integrate the 
now grown-ups and their offspring in basic and  
advanced education, vocational training, polytechnics, 
colleges and universities offering subjects, skills  
development and qualifications that match the needs 
of the regional (ECOWAS) labour market. The open 
borders for trade, and the freedom of movement 
through the ECOWAS travel certificate are the ideal 
preconditions for the youth to be integrated in the  
regional trade and business market. Further precon-
ditions have been created during protracted displace-
ment in West Africa with many friendly and family 
relationships as well as business relations between 
citizens of Sierra Leone and the neighbouring coun-
tries. The governments of the region should  
deliberately build on this positive outcome of the  
negative experience of a decade of war. 
Guiding the transition from training or studying 
to employment and supporting business start-ups 
until the graduates can sustain themselves and their 
young families will be crucial to integrate the vast  
majority of the youth as full members into society. 
The reason to advocate for such a strong focus on the 
youth is that, according to the above analysis, wide-
spread grievances, unemployment, imposed idleness 
and exclusion from meaningful political and social 
participation have contributed significantly to the 
particularly cruel course of the war as well as to the 
recurrent electoral violence until 2018. Redressing 
the decade-long neglect of the youth requires the full 
commitment of the government and, as far as needed, 
assistance by international development agencies.
A serious focus on integrating the youth requires 
transparent procedures of holding state authorities 
and elected representatives accountable. The youth 
needs to experience that they have rights that they 
can claim successfully through peaceful procedures 
that lead to a justified decision within a short—or at 
least clearly fixed - time. The youth also needs to  
experience the normalcy of conflict in all its varieties—
and that it can be resolved by non-violent means. 
From this perspective, setting up effective state 
institutions that are not politically biased and  
establishing the rule of law in Sierra Leone become  
necessary conditions for future peace. 
A final aspect related to the youth is the need to 
avoid dependence on aid. The post-war generation 
that largely experienced protracted displacement 
was still largely donor-dependent—a structure that 
reached deeply into those government authorities 
that were responsible for social services and reinte-
gration (predominantly NaCSA). The experience of 
the young generation(s) should be that self-reliance, 
based on the local and regional natural resources, 
capital, skills, relationships and infrastructure,  
becomes normality. This will imply developing 
self-confidence and creativity to find solutions for 
problems independently from international agencies 
and assistance but through much more engagement 
of the government, its authorities and representatives 
at all levels and a variety of societal organisations. 
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List of interview partners
Interviews in Freetown, 26–27 April; 28–30 May,  
2 July 2018
   \ Malte Kirchner, country director, GIZ Regional 
Office Sierra Leone, Liberia
   \ Dr Sylvanus Spencer, Department of History 
and African Studies, Fourah Bay College
   \ Nathaniel King, publicist, Freetown, Sierra Leone
   \ Dr Alex Sivalie Mbayo, College for Peace &  
Conflict Studies, Fourah Bay University
   \ Officers of NaCSA (protection and reintegration 
departments)
   \ Officer of the national electoral commission
   \ Chairman of Fambul Tok
Interviews in Kenema, 29 April–1 May 2018
   \ Three market vendors, one of them injured 
during the post-election unrest
   \ A group of men (SLPP supporters) sitting in the 
shadow of a tree
   \ A young man, inhabitant of Kenema
   \ Mayor of Kenema City Council
   \ A primary school teacher
   \ A secondary school teacher 
   \ A lieutenant colonel
   \ Acting Police Inspector General
   \ Chairman of MRD (Movement for the  
Restoration of Democracy)
   \ Secretary of the SLPP, eastern region
   \ Chairman of the APC, eastern region
   \ A journalist
   \ Chairman of the motorbike taxi drivers’ union
   \ Three ex-combatants from RUF, AFRC, Kamajor
   \ A pastor and coordinator of the Justice and 
Peace Commission
   \ Chairman of the National Youth Commission
   \ Officer of NaCSA
Interviews in two villages, Bomaru and Baiwala,  
2–6 May 2018
   \ Three elders
   \ Bomaru village assembly
   \ A guesthouse attendant
   \ Three formerly displaced women
   \ Town chief
   \ Deputy chief
   \ Three ex-combatants of the RUF
Interviews in Kailahun, 8–10 May 2018
   \ Staff member of an NGO working in child 
protection
   \ A local chief
   \ A group of Liberians
   \ A group of women petty traders
21 interviews including three focus group discus-
sions with youth in Freetown, Bo and Pujehun by 
Jande Victoria Dembe between May and July 2018
   \ A former camp chairman 
   \ Focus group discussion with older Sierra 
Leonean refugees and their leaders 
   \ Focus group discussion with former ECOMOG 
soldiers 
   \ An older Sierra Leonean who was denied the 
refugee status since 2004 
   \ An inhabitant of a former camp 
   \ A Liberian neighbour
   \ Focus group discussion with former ECOMOG 
soldiers in a camp 
   \ UNHCR assistant protection officer
   \ Focus group discussion with LRRRC 
representatives 
   \ A young Liberian girl
   \ Older Liberian chief
   \ A journalist originating from Sierra Leone
   \ A youth spokesman originating from Sierra 
Leone
   \ UNHCR staff members
   \
30 Interviews between May and July 2018 by Julius 
Togba in Liberian camps in and around Monrovia
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AFRC  Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone) AFRC 
APC All People’s Congress (Sierra Leone) APC
CDF  Civil Defence Forces (Sierra Leone) CDF
ECOMOG ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group ECOMOG
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS
IDP Internally displaced person IDP
LRRRC Liberia Repatriation and Resettlement Commission LRRRC
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy LURD
MRD Movement for the Restoration of Democracy MRD
NaCSA National Commission for Social Action (Sierra Leone) NaCSA
NGO non-governmental organisation NGO
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia NPFL
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council (Sierra Leone) NPRC
RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) RUF
RWC Refugee Welfare Committee (for Sierra Leoneans in Liberia) RWC
SLL Sierra Leone Leone (currency of Sierra Leone) SLL
SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party SLPP
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission TRC
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund UNICEF
UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSC
USAID United States Agency for International Development USAID
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ANNEX
Year Sierra Leone Liberia
Early  
history
The Bulom are the earliest known inhabitants of the 
territory, with the Krim and Gola people arriving by AD 
1400. The Mende and Temne settled in the 15th century, 
and the Fulani moved into the northern region.
The Dei, Bassa, Kru, Gola and Kissi are some of the earliest 
arrivals to the region, around the 12th century. The new 
inhabitants brought with them skills in cotton spinning, 
cloth weaving, iron smelting, rice and sorghum cultivation, 
as well as the social and political institutions of the Mali 
and Songhai Empires.
15th  
century
Portuguese seafarers explore the coast. Pedro de Cintra gives 
Sierra Leone its present name and builds a fort on the site 
of Freetown. Europeans trade along the coast without 
formally establishing themselves.
18th 
century
In 1787, British abolitionists settle 400 people, formerly 
slaves, on a strip of land bought from a local chief. Over 
the following years, more settlers arrive, many of them 
freed slaves from Jamaica and Nova Scotia.
1807 The British parliament declares the slave trade illegal.  
A British naval station is established at Freetown to 
intercept slavers continuing to operate; people rescued 
from the slave-ships are settled in Sierra Leone.
1808 Freetown becomes a British colony
1820 The American Colonisation Society sends its first envoy 
to Sierra Leone.
1821/1822 The American Colonisation Society purchases land in Grand 
Bassa from tribal leaders for trading goods, supplies, 
weapons, and rum. Named after US President James 
Monroe, Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, is founded in 
1822.
The American Colonisation Society spearheads the return 
movement of freed American blacks following the abolition 
of slavery. The Back to Africa movement is favoured by those 
who are against black integration in America.  
Returnees identify themselves as Americo-Liberians. They 
develop a culture that closely resembles that of the American 
south, even instituting the notion of racial superiority.
Annex  
Historical synopsis: Sierra Leone and Liberia
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1820s The American Colonisation Society spearheads the return 
movement of freed American blacks following the abolition 
of slavery. The Back to Africa movement is favoured by those 
who are against black integration in America. Returnees 
identify themselves as Americo- Liberians. They develop a 
culture that closely resembles that of the American south, 
even instituting the notion of racial superiority.
1847 On 26 July 1847, the settlers declare their independence from 
America and promulgate a Constitution that will last until 
1986. The 1847 Constitution, modelled on the US American 
constitution, establishes the Republic of Liberia as a uni-
tary state.
1848 During the 19th century, the colonial rulers forge admin-
istrative links with The Gambia, the Gold Coast (now 
Ghana) and Lagos in Nigeria.
Liberia’s first elections are held. Joseph Jenkins Roberts be-
comes Liberia’s first President. The minority Americo- 
Liberians dominate the new government and subjugate the 
inland ethnic groups. Indigenous Africans do not have the 
opportunity for citizenship.
1863 A legislative council is created.
1869 The True Whig Party is founded and becomes the dominant 
political party in Liberia.
1896 The coastal and inland areas become a British 
protectorate.
1904 Indigenous Africans get the right to citizenship.
1929 An International Commission report finds that the Liberian 
officials are profiting from forced labour of the indigenous 
people.
1944 William Tubman is elected to the first of his seven 
presidential terms (until 1971).
1946 The right to vote and participate in elections is extended to 
the indigenous property owners and women.
1956/ 
1957
The progressively enlarged and representative legislative 
council becomes the House of Representatives. Most men 
are eligible to vote; women who are tax- payers or own 
property are also enfranchised.
During the 1950s, bolstered by the US Lend and Lease  
and President William Tubman’s economic liberalisation 
policies, Liberia reaches the world’s second-highest growth 
rate. Liberia takes an active role in international affairs as a 
founding member of the United Nations and the Organisa-
tion of African Unity.
1958 Racial discrimination is outlawed.
1961 A new constitution comes into force, establishing a uni-
cameral parliament and Queen Elizabeth II as  
sovereign. On that basis, Sierra Leone becomes independ-
ent on 27 April 1961.
1962 Two main parties share the votes in a multiparty  
political system. First in office was the Sierra Leone Peo-
ple’s Party (SLPP) during 1962-67 under Sir Milton Margai.
Coups d’état in Sierra Leone
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1967/68 The All People’s Congress (APC) under Siaka Stevens wins 
the 1967 elections. Soon after, Stevens is arrested in a coup. 
Days later another army coup imposes military rule until 
the next year. After a further coup, Stevens is reinstated  
as prime minister. The independence constitution is  
abrogated during the series of military coups.
1971 Sierra Leone creates a new constitution and becomes  
a republic with Stevens as executive president.
William R. Tolbert is elected president.
1973-77 The SLPP boycotts the general election of 1973. APC wins 
the election as well as the elections in 1977 after a  
campaign which sparks violence.
1978 A new constitution establishes a one-party state,  
with the APC as the only recognised party.
Rising violence in Sierra Leone and Libeia
1979/80 A rally protesting against the increase in rice prices ends in 
violence and loss of lives. In 1980, a coup led by Samuel K. 
Doe assassinates President Tolbert and overthrows the  
government, suspending the constitution. The coup marks 
the end of Americo-Liberians’ political dominance.
1981-84 Single-party elections in 1982 are once again violent. Doe and his cohorts form the People’s Redemption Council 
and suspend the 1847 constitution. The new constitution 
increases the President’s term from four to six years and 
removes the prohibition against military personnel being 
members of government. Provisions establishing two 
autonomous agencies to approve judicial candidates and 
investigate corruption are deleted. On 3 July 1984, the new 
constitution is approved in a referendum with 78.3 per cent 
of votes.
1985 Major-General Joseph Momoh succeeds Stevens as 
president.
The new constitution establishes the second Liberian  
Republic, and Samuel K. Doe is elected Liberia’s first indige-
nous president. The International Community does not  
endorse the election, and internal actors see it as a sham 
designed to legitimise the Doe regime. Nevertheless, Doe’s 
government becomes a strategic ally to the US from whom it 
received significant financial backing.
1986 Internal resistance fuels a failed coup by a founding member 
of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF). In  
response, Doe adopts reactionary measures that set the 
country on the path of internal conflict.
Civil war in Liberia
1989 Economic conditions deteriorate during the 1980s.  
Demands for constitutional reform are rising. The  
government sets up a constitutional review commission.
Charles Taylor, a former member of the Doe government, 
launches an attack that develops into an uprising leading to 
the First Liberian Civil War.
1990 Rebels publicly execute Doe. Infighting within the rebel 
movement leads to a split that prolongs the conflict to 1997 
and attracts the intervention of peacekeepers of the  
Economic Coalition of Western African States (ECOWAS).
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Civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
1991 The recommendation by the constitutional review  
commission to return to a multiparty democratic system 
is overwhelmingly endorsed in a referendum in August 
1991. The new constitution marks a return to a multiparty 
system, though the country remains a republic with an 
executive presidency. An army coup interrupts the imple-
mentation of this constitution. The National Provisional 
Ruling Council (NPRC) becomes the governing body and 
rules by decree. Violence from a rebel movement, the  
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), that started in March 
escalates. Liberian rebels with whom the RUF is loosely 
allied make incursions into southern and eastern Sierra 
Leone.
1992-94 Captain Valentine Strasser takes control after a coup by 
junior army officers. The constitution is suspended. The 
war escalates. Strasser hires white South-African merce-
naries, the ‘Executive Outcomes’, to defend Sierra Leone’s 
diamond mines and to support the armed forces. The army 
also cooperates with the Kamajors, groups of armed men 
stemming mostly from the Mende-speaking eastern  
region of Sierra Leone. Many educated members of the 
Kamajors engage in the war against the RUF after  
undergoing an initiation ritual to become ‘bullet-proof’.
1995/96 Despite air and ground support from Nigeria and troops 
provided by Guinea, by 1995 the government only controls 
the capital Freetown. In January 1996, Strasser is over-
thrown by his deputy Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. The 
1991 constitution is restored, returning the country to a 
multiparty system with an executive presidency and a 
unicameral legislature. Parliamentary and presidential 
elections are held in February 1996. The SLPP candidate, 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah wins and is sworn in as president 
in March 1996. In November, talks between the govern-
ment and RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh reach an 
agreement to end the war. The agreement allows the RUF 
to register as a political party and permits it access to the 
media. The war has displaced two million people and 
caused over 10,000 deaths. RUF leader Sankoh is arrested 
while on a visit to Nigeria.
1997 In May 1997, a military coup led by Major Johnny Paul  
Koroma overthrows the Kabbah government. The deputy 
minister of defence mobilises a vast but untrained civil 
defence force (Kamajors) to oppose the Armed Forces  
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the military junta. In October, 
ECOWAS brokerage leads to a deal in Conakry, Guinea, in 
which the AFRC regime agrees with exiled president  
Kabbah to a six-month transition to restore the legitimate 
civilian government. Apart from a few skirmishes in the 
area of the diamond mines, the transitional period starts 
peacefully.
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1998 In February, renewed fighting breaks out between Nigerian- 
led peacekeeping troops of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Moni-
toring Group (ECOMOG) and Koroma’s forces in Freetown. 
A few days later, ECOMOG forces capture Freetown and 
detain many members of the military regime, though not 
Koroma. After nine months in exile in Conakry, President 
Kabbah returns to Freetown in March 1998. Parliament 
reconvenes with about half of its members. Within a few 
days, thousands of people return to their homes in Free-
town. In July, the UN agrees to establish an observer  
mission to monitor the military and security situation in 
the country and to advise the government on rebuilding 
the police and security forces. Sankoh is returned to Free-
town from detention in Lagos to face charges of treason. 
He is sentenced to death in October. On news of Sankoh’s 
death sentence, RUF and AFRC rebels launch a brutal  
campaign in towns and villages they rapidly take over as 
they advance on Freetown. In the southern and eastern  
regions, the Kamajor committed disproportionate levels of 
violations against people of northern origin, among them 
Temne, Koranko, Loko, Limba and Yalunka.
1999 In January, Nigerian troops halt the rebels’ advance close 
to the capital. A peace agreement is signed in July, which 
includes a power-sharing arrangement between Kabbah 
and the RUF, annulment of Sankoh’s death sentence and 
the release of those sentenced for their role in the 1997 
coup. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommends the 
deployment of 6,000 troops to Sierra Leone to guarantee 
the peace agreement. UN peacekeepers proceed with 
disarming rebel troops and take control over a growing 
area of the country.
The newly formed rebel group of Liberians United for  
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launches an armed 
insurrection against Taylor’s government sparking off the 
Second Liberian Civil War.
2000/01 International troops are increased to 11,000 after the 
departure of ECOMOG. In May 2000, as the UN peacekeepers 
move into the diamond-producing region and begin to 
demobilise the rebels; the peace agreement collapses. The 
rebels take 500 UN troops hostage, and fighting resumes 
between the Sierra Leonean Army and the rebels. Power- 
sharing ceases. Sankoh is arrested. The hostages are  
released unharmed. In July, the UN resolves to ban trade 
in uncut diamonds from Sierra Leone until the govern-
ment has established an authentication system. However, 
the illicit trade continues into 2001.
The United Nations imposes a ban on exports of diamonds 
from Liberia to stem the flow of "blood diamonds", which 
helped to fund the civil war.
2002 In the presidential and parliamentary elections in May, 
Kabbah and the SLPP win a landslide victory, with about 
70 per cent of the votes in the presidential election and 
winning 83 of the 112 parliamentary seats. The RUF Party 
fails to secure any seat. The election observers say that the 
conditions enabled the will of the people to be expressed. 
The legislature comprises 112 directly elected candidates 
from 14 constituencies and 12 paramount chiefs.
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2003 The armed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MDL)  
supports LURD’s war and launches attacks against Taylor 
in a battle to conquer Monrovia. In July, Taylor is accused of 
war crimes. ECOWAS provides peacekeepers to Liberia. Under 
pressure from the International Community as well as 
armed groups and civil society organisations within Liberia, 
Taylor resigns in August 2003 and goes into exile in Nigeria. 
International peacekeepers arrive and sign a deal with the 
rebels. In October, a UN Mission is established in Liberia, 
and an interim government is formed. The two successive 
civil wars have left more than 200,000 dead, displaced  
hundreds of thousands and shattered the country’s economy 
and infrastructure.
Return to peace in Sierra Leone and Liberia
2004/05 In June, special courts with Sierra Leonean and UN- 
appointed judges begin trying those accused of war 
crimes both on government and rebel sides of the civil 
war.
The United Nations establishes a mission in Liberia, and an 
interim government takes control in October.
2005 New elections, considered by many as the country’s most 
credible elections, make Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Africa’s first 
female president. She is head of the Unity Party.
2006 The government sets up a Truth and Reconciliation  
Commission to investigate allegations of human rights 
crimes and causes of war crimes between 1979 and 2003. 
2007 In the parliamentary elections in August, the APC is the 
strongest party with 59 seats, the SLPP wins 43 seats and 
the People’s Movement for Democratic Change 10. APC 
leader Ernest Bai Koroma wins the presidential election 
with 44 per cent of votes. In the second round, Koroma 
receives 54.6 per cent of votes and is sworn in as presi-
dent. Commonwealth observers report that the elections 
have been conducted in a democratic, credible and  
professional way in accordance with internationally  
accepted standards.
Charles Taylor's war crimes trial starts in The Hague, where 
he stands accused of instigating atrocities in Sierra Leone. 
The UN Security Council lifts its ban on Liberian diamond 
exports.
2009/10 President Johnson Sirleaf admits to the Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission that she mistakenly backed ex-President 
Charles Taylor when he launched the 14-year civil war in 
1989. The commission submits its report to parliament,  
recommends prosecuting 200 people and listing others who 
should be barred from public office, including President 
Johnson Sirleaf. The United Nations Security Council votes 
to extend the mandate of UN forces in Liberia (UNMIL) 
into 2010 to assist in the organisation of the 2011 elections.
2011 Presidential candidate Johnson Sirleaf wins her second 
term. Her main rival boycotts the second election round 
claiming fraud.
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2012 Presidential, parliamentary and local council elections 
are held in November. President Koroma is re-elected 
with 58.7 per cent of the votes cast. His main challenger, 
the SLPP’s candidate Julius Maada Bio, receives 37.4 per 
cent. In the parliamentary elections, the APC secures 67  
of 112 directly elective seats and the SLPP 42. The  
Commonwealth observers conclude that the organisation 
and conduct of these elections have met international 
standards for free and transparent multiparty elections.
Ex-president Charles Taylor is found guilty of war crimes 
for aiding and directing rebels in Sierra Leone. The Interna-
tional Criminal Court in The Hague sentences him to 50 
years in jail. The government initiates a process to review 
the country’s constitution. The process has to address the 
lack of faith many Liberians have in the government.  
Successive Liberian governments have been riddled with  
corruption. Embezzlement of public funds has resulted in 
citizen resentment in meeting their tax obligations and  
distrust of the government. There is a need to empower the 
citizenry, especially women groups, to enable them to make 
a meaningful contribution to the process. The proposed 
amendments, once approved by the legislature will be put to 
a referendum vote, following a period of public review and 
input.
2013 UNHCR completes a programme that helped more than  
155,000 Liberians to return home, hailing it as evidence of 
the return of peace after the civil war.
2016 UNMIL hand back responsibility for security to the  
country's army and police. The mission was first deployed  
in 2003.
2017 George Weah (Congress for Democratic Change Party) is 
elected president with 61.5 per cent of second-round votes. 
His party wins 21 of 73 parliamentary seats.
2018 General elections are held in Sierra Leone to elect the 
president, parliament and local councils. President Maada 
Bio (SLPP) wins the election run-off and becomes 
president.
Sources: HRW, 1993; The Commonwealth, 2018; Constitution.net., 2016; BBC News, 2018; Shaw, 2003.
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